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Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of 
Construction:
Ḥudūd-Avoidance in Cases of Doubt
 Intisar A. Rabb*
Abstract
Legal maxims reﬂect settled principles of law to which jurists appeal when confronting 
new legal cases. One such maxim of Islamic criminal law stipulates that judges are 
to avoid imposing ḥudūd and other sanctions when beset by doubts as to the scope 
of the law or the suﬃciency of the evidence (idra’ū ʾ l-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt): the “ḥudūd 
maxim.” Jurists of all periods reference this maxim widely. But whereas developed 
juristic works attribute it to Muḥammad in the form of a prophetic report (ḥadīth), 
early jurists do not. Instead, they cite the maxim as an anonymous saying of nonspeciﬁc 
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provenance in a form unknown to ḥadīth collectors of the ﬁrst three centuries after 
Islam’s advent. is diﬀerence in the jurists’ citations of the maxim signals a signiﬁcant 
shift in claims to legal authority and the asserted scope of judicial discretion, as jurists 
debated whether and how to resolve legal and factual doubt. While political authorities 
exercised increasingly wide discretion over criminal matters and used it to beneﬁt the 
elite, most jurists promoted an egalitarian “jurisprudence of doubt” through insisting 
on criminal liability for high-status oﬀenders and heightening claims of the authoritative-
ness and scope of the ḥudūd maxim as a ḥadīth. 
Keywords
ambiguity, doubt, criminal law, ḥadīth, ḥudūd, interpretation, legal maxims, lenity, 
qawāʿid ﬁqhiyya, shubha/shubahāt 
Indeed, avoidance of ḥudūd in cases of doubt
Inna darʾa ʾl-ḥudūdi biʾl-shubahāt
Is a ḥadīth told by all transmitters of reputed clout….
La-ḥadīthun rawāhu kullu ʾl-thiqāt….1 
1. Introduction
Given the appearance or accusation of criminal misconduct, how does 
a judge really know when to punish the accused, and what should she 
do in cases of doubt? Consider this case: 
During the time of the Muslim polity’s fourth caliph ʿAlī, Medina’s patrol 
found a man in the town ruins with a blood-stained knife in hand, standing 
over the corpse of a man who had recently been stabbed to death. When 
they arrested him, he immediately confessed: “I killed him.” He was brought 
before ʿAlī, who sentenced him to death for the deed. Before the sentence 
was carried out, another man hurried forward, telling the executioners not 
to be so hasty. “Do not kill him. I did it,” he announced. ʿAlī turned to the 
condemned man, incredulously. “What made you confess to a murder that 
you did not commit?!” he asked. e man explained that he thought that 
ʿAlī would never take his word over that of the patrolmen who had witnessed 
a crime scene; for all signs pointed to him as the perpetrator. In reality, the 
man explained, he was a butcher who had just ﬁnished slaughtering a cow. 
1) Abū ʾl-Ḥasan al-Shantarīnī (d. 542/1147), al-Dhakhīra fī maḥāsin ahl al-Jazīra, ed. 
Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-aqāfa, 1979), 7:355-7 (s.v. al-Ḥakīm Abū Muḥammad 
al-Miṣrī).
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Immediately afterward, he needed to relieve himself, so entered into the area 
of the ruins, bloody knife still in-hand. Upon return, he came across the 
dead man, and stood over him in concern. It was then that the patrol arrested 
him. He ﬁgured that he could not plausibly deny having committed the 
crime of murder. He surrendered himself and confessed to the “obvious,” 
deciding to leave the truth of the matter in God’s hands. e second man 
oﬀered a corroborating story. He explained that he was the one who had 
murdered for money and ﬂed when he heard the sounds of the patrol approach-
ing. On his way out, he passed the butcher on the way in and watched the 
events previously described unfold. But once the ﬁrst man was condemned 
to death, the second man said that he had to step forward, because he did 
not want the blood of two men on his hands.2
In answer to the question of when a judge knows when to apply a 
criminal sanction, most legal systems require knowledge beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that is, virtually incontrovertible proof of the alleged 
crime’s commission through evidence that directly points to the accused 
as actual perpetrator. One byproduct of this requirement is a principle 
that punishments are to be avoided whenever there is ambiguity or 
doubt as to the textual basis, evidence, or criminal culpability of the 
accused. At common law and in medieval Europe, this took on various 
forms.3 In modern American law, it is expressed in a legal maxim called 
the “rule of lenity.”4 In Islamic law, we may call a parallel expression 
2) Ibrāhīm b. Hāshim al-Qummī (d. mid-3rd/9th c.), Qaḍāyā Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿ Alī b. Abī 
Ṭālib, ed. Fāris Ḥassūn Karīm (Qum: Muʾassasat Amīr al-Muʾminīn, 1382/[2003]), 88-9, 
238 (paraphrased). Both Sunnī and Shīʿī scholars cite this as an example of clever ḥudūd 
jurisprudence. See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), al-Ṭuruq al-ḥukmiyya, ed. 
Muḥammad Jamīl Ghāzī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Madanī, 1978), 82-4 (quoting Qaḍāyā ʿAlī 
and ʿAjāʾib [aḥkām Amīr al-Muʾminīn = Qaḍāyā ʿAlī, as given in the edition of Muḥsin 
Amīn al-ʿĀmilī, ʿAjāʾib aḥkām Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib ([Qum?]: Markaz 
al-Ghadīr lil-Dirāsāt al-Islāmiyya, 2000)]); al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1104/1692), Wasāʾil 
al-Shīʿa, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥīm al-Rabbānī al-Shīrāzī (Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, 1383-
1989/[1963-4 - 1969]), 2:172, no. 2. 
3) For the development of reasonable doubt jurisprudence in the English common law and 
in continental European law, see now James Q. Whitman, e Origins of Reasonable Doubt 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008) (discussing the emergence of the reasonable 
doubt doctrine as a version of lenity in England and Continental Europe); see also John 
Langbein, e Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), 334-6 (detailing the methods by which court oﬃcials in England avoided 
prosecuting criminals as a precursor to the formalized rule of lenity).
4) See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. __ [128 S. Ct. 2020], *6 (2008) (“e rule of lenity 
requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to 
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the “ḥudūd maxim,” which directs judges to “avoid (imposing) fixed 
criminal sanctions (ḥudūd) in cases of doubt or ambiguity (idraʾū 
ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt).”
The ḥudūd maxim is a central principle of Islamic criminal law 
applied to situations where a judge has no firm textual or evidentiary 
basis for imposing a criminal punishment. In the above case, the textual 
basis was thought to be certain, as murder is clearly prohibited and as 
guilt is usually established through confession or witness testimony.5 
But an evidentiary doubt arose as soon as the real perpetrator stepped 
in. ʿAlī released  the first man and pardoned the second—perhaps 
because the facts surrounding the case had become irresolvably doubt-
ful without a failsafe means to validate one story over the other. What 
is the legal basis for such practices and how prevalent are they in Islamic 
law?
The overwhelming majority of late-medieval and contemporary 
jurists—both Sunnī and Shīʿī—view the ḥudūd maxim as a sound 
 prophetic ḥadīth.6 Its prophetic pedigree is significant because ḥadīths 
them.”) (citations omitted); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 35, 43 (1820) (“e rule 
that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than construction 
itself.”). Cf. William N. Eskridge et al., Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy, 
3rd ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 2001), Appendix B, 23 (deﬁning the rule of lenity as the legal 
maxim “against applying punitive sanctions if there is ambiguity as to underlying criminal 
liability or criminal penalty”); Jabez Gridley Sutherland, Statues and Statutory Construction, 
ed. Norman J. Singer (Chicago: Callaghan, 1992), § 59.03 (deﬁning the rule of lenity as 
a canon of statutory construction providing that “penal statutes should be strictly construed 
against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory penalties and in favor of the 
persons on whom penalties are sought to be imposed).
5) Mālikīs hold that guilt can be established by “strong” circumstantial evidence, as in 
pregnancy of an unmarried woman as evidence of fornication or adultery (zinā). On 
evidentiary rules, see Ṣubḥī Maḥmaṣānī, Falsafat al-tashrīʿ fī ʾl-Islām, 5th ed. (Beirut: Dār 
al-ʿIlm lil-Malāyyīn, 1980 [1st ed. 1946]), 325-76 (English trans., Farhat Ziadeh, e 
Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1961)); and the sections on evidence in 
general works of Islamic criminal law, e.g., ʿ Abd al-Qādir ʿ Awda, al-Tashrīʿ al-jināʾī al-Islāmī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1968); Ramsīs Behnām, al-Naẓariyya al-ʿāmma lil-qānūn 
al-jināʾī (Alexandria: Munshaʾāt al-Maʿārif, 1968); Cherif Bassiouni, ed., e Islamic 
Criminal Justice System (London; New York: Oceana Publications, 1982).
6) See below, pp. 30-34. NB: ough the term “Shīʿī” can refer to Zaydīs, Ismāʿīlīs, and 
Twelver or Ithnā ʿAsharīs; and although all can be considered in some sense Shīʿī and the 
latter two Imāmī, for shorthand, I use the term Shīʿī (without qualiﬁcation) to refer to the 
Twelver-Imāmīs, who comprise the majority of the Shīʿa. When mentioning other Shīʿī 
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form an authoritative source of Islamic law. They are taken, alongside 
the Qurʾān, to legislate mandatory fixed sanctio ns for certain grave 
offenses. It is the ability to appeal to the Prophet’s normative instruc-
tions that provides jurists with firm legal bases for adjudication, espe-
cially in the sensitive area of criminal law. Thus, the prophetic 
provenance of the ḥudūd maxim may be considered to have facilitated, 
indeed anchored, the jurisprudence of Islamic criminal law.
But the maxim was not always prophetic. Ḥadīth scholars of the early 
period (i.e., the first three centuries after the Hijra) typically did not 
regard it as such. Neither did jurists who applied it during the same 
period. It is curious then that in later juristic works the maxim achieves 
such prominence as a prophetic ḥadīth. What does this say about the 
legal basis for the practice of ḥudūd-avoidance and the role of legal 
maxims in early Islamic law more generally?
One view of legal maxims is that they reflect substantive canons 
of construction. These are presumptions about the meaning of a text 
drawn from substantive and structural concerns rather than just lin-
guistic rules of thumb.7 An example of a linguistic rule is that jurists 
groups, I typically refer to them by the designations for which they have become best 
known, i.e., Ismāʿīlīs and Zaydīs.
7) Legal scholars categorize maxims in various ways. In Islamic law, a common strategy is 
to divide maxims between textual principles of interpretation drawn from the ﬁeld of 
jurisprudence and accordingly called interpretive canons or maxims (qawāʿid uṣūliyya), and 
principles more closely related to the structure or substance of positive law and called here 
substantive canons or maxims (qawāʿid ﬁqhiyya). In addition, grouped under the rubric of 
substantive maxims are ﬁve universal maxims that most jurists list as embodying meta-rules 
of law along with judicial maxims that govern rules of procedure and evidence. See, for 
example, Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Maqqarī (d. 758/1357), al-Qawāʿid, ed. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd Allāh 
b. Ḥamīd (Mecca: Jāmiʿat Umm al-Qurā, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth 
al-Islāmī, 198-), 212; Miq4dād al-Suyūrī (d. 826/1423), Naḍd al-Qawāʿid al-ﬁqhiyya ʿalā 
madhhab al-Imāmiyya, ed. ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Kūhkamarī et al. (Qum: Maktabat Āyat Allāh 
al-ʿUẓmā al-Marʿashī, 1403/1982-3), 90-114; Zayn al-Dīn b. Nujaym (d. 970/1563), 
al-Ashbāh waʾl-naẓāʾir, ed. Muḥammad Muṭīʿ al-Ḥāﬁẓ (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1983), 
1:17-9. For other divisions, see, e.g., Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), al-Ashbāh waʾl-
naẓāʾir, ed. Muḥammad al-Muʿtaṣim bi-ʾllāh al-Baghdādī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 
1998), 35, 201, 299, 337; Nāṣir Makārim Shīrāzī (d. 1305/1887-8), al-Qawāʿid al-ﬁqhiyya 
(Qum: Madrasat al-Imām ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, 1416), 1:26-7 (ﬁve categories). For overviews 
of Islamic legal maxims, see Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Qawāʿid as a Genre of Legal Literature,” 
in Bernard Weiss, ed., Studies in Islamic Legal eory (Leiden: Brill, 2002) (and sources 
listed therein); Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Legal Maxims and Other Genres of Literature 
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should follow the plain meaning of the text unless clear indicators 
require a departure from that meaning. By contrast, substantive rules 
impose interpretive requirements, such as narrow construction, for cer-
tain areas of law such as criminal law. In this context, Islamic legal 
theory specifies that only God can impose and has imposed fixed pun-
ishments for certain grave offenses; it follows that ḥudūd punishments 
cannot apply without a clear statement that a certain activity falls within 
the ambit of the prohibition.8 Moreover, the extremely harsh nature of 
ḥudūd punishments marks them as deterrents against moral offenses.9 
In significant ways, the ḥudūd maxim captures these ideas of divine 
legislative supremacy and deterrence theory, and translates them into 
a canon of narrow construction for matters relating to criminal law.
This essay traces the transformation of the maxim from its earliest 
appearance to its later conception. I first examine the maxim as it 
appears in ḥadīth collections during the first three centuries AH, then 
I assess its parallel appearances in juristic works, where citations of it 
in Islamic Jurisprudence,” Arab Law Quarterly 20, 1 (2006): 77-101; Wolfhart Heinrichs, 
art. “Ḳawāid Fiḳhiyya,” EI 2-Supplement (Online Edition: Brill, 2008).
 In American law, divisions similarly fall along linguistic and substantive principles of 
interpretation, the deﬁnitions of each revealing signiﬁcant diﬀerences compared to Islamic 
law. Linguistic and jurisprudential principles generally are much more ﬂuid and less 
systematic than the ones articulated in the uṣūl al-ﬁqh literature. Substantive principles 
arise from precedents and policies drawn from the common law, other statutes, or the U.S. 
Constitution. See, e.g., Eskridge et al., Legislation, 818-9; see also ibid. 920 (adding a 
category of “extrinsic aids” for interpretation drawn from the same sources as those of 
substantive canons but specifying linguistic principles). For other divisions and treatments, 
see, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, “Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical 
Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross,” Vanderbilt Law Review 45 (1992): 579-91, esp. 
580 (linguistic canons); James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, “Canons of Construction 
and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning,” Vanderbilt Law Review 58 (2005): 1-116 
(summarizing major theories).
8) See, e.g., Abū ʾl-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī, al-Kāfī fī ʾl-ﬁqh, ed. Riḍā Ustādī (Iṣfahān: Maktabat 
al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿ Alī al-ʿĀmma), 404 (noting the Shīʿī view that ḥudūd violations 
are acts known rationally to be major moral oﬀenses (qabāʾiḥ) that also warrant a punish-
ment as speciﬁed by God); Māwardī, Ḥāwī, 1:101 (citing the similar Sunnī view of a 
3rd/9th century scholar, Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), that ḥudūd are “punishments with 
which God deters people from committing prohibited [acts] and encourages them to follow 
His commands”). See also the overviews of Islamic criminal law listed in note 5.
9) See, e.g., al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044), Intiṣār, ed. Muḥammad Riḍā al-Sayyid 
Ḥasan al-Kharsān (Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1971), 252; Māwardī, Ḥāwī, 1:99.
 I.A. Rabb / Islamic Law and Society 17 (2010) 63-125 69
differ significantly. Only after this period do ḥadīth collectors and jurists 
alike begin to ascribe prophetic origins to the maxim. Accordingly, I 
examine later ḥadīth collections only to uncover entirely new versions 
of the maxim as a ḥadīth now attributed to the Prophet. Finally, I turn 
to the later juristic sources to consider new legal conceptions and appli-
cations of the maxim. It is here that we can readily observe the firm 
entrenchment of the maxim in Islamic criminal jurisprudence, after it 
was transformed from an anonymous principle into a rule that was 
regarded as both a central canon for resolving legal doubt and a pro-
phetic ḥadīth. 
II. e Ḥudūd Maxim as a Ḥadīth?10 
A. Early Ḥadīth Collections
Ḥadīth scholars and critics of the first three centuries AH adduce several 
versions of the ḥudūd maxim—none of them in the form that came to 
be popularized as above. Only two of the six canonical Sunnī ḥadīth 
collections—those of Ibn Mājah and Tirmidhī—record a version. The 
earlier collections of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī and Ibn Abī Shayba 
contain an additional five.11 All attribute the maxim to various 
 Companions and to early jurists.12 With one exception, none of these 
scholars seriously thinks that this was a prophetic statement. The single 
10) Detailed references for each ḥadīth version of the ḥudūd maxim, along with the col-
lections in which they appear and the full chains adduced for each are listed in the Appendix. 
is section will reference only works and the death dates of traditionists mentioned in 
the text where speciﬁcally relevant to the argument. 
11) e Muṣannafs of ʿAbd al-Razzāq and Ibn Abī Shayba are illuminating because they 
record statements from their teachers and from earlier jurists; they do not conﬁne themselves 
to authenticated prophetic reports as the canonical collections mainly attempt, especially 
the principal two, the Ṣaḥīḥs of Bukhārī and Muslim. ey also preserve records of 1st/7th- 
and early 2nd/8th-century written works and teachings. See Harald Motzki, Die Anfänge der 
Islamischen Jurisprudenz. Ihre Entwicklung in Mekka bis zur Mitte des 2./8. Jahrhunderts 
(Stuttgart/Leiden: Brill, 1997), trans. Marion Katz, e Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: 
Meccan Fiqh Before the Classical Schools (2001), esp. 51-73.
12) at is, Companions ʿ Umar, ʿ Āʾisha, Ibn Masʿūd, Muʿādh b. Jabal, and ʿ Uqba b. ʿ Āmir, 
as well as jurist Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. ca. 96/717) and traditionist Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī 
(d. 124/742). See Appendix.
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attribution to the Prophet is a weak one, according to Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal 
and most other traditionists.13 The other four canonical collectors do 
not mention the maxim. And there appear to be no records of the state-
ment in Shīʿī sources of the time.14 
In sum, no ḥadīth collector of the early period reliably traced the 
ḥudūd maxim to the Prophet. Moreover, there is no record at all in 
extant ḥadīth compilations from the first three centuries of what was 
to become the standard version of a common “prophetic” maxim (idraʾū 
ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt).15 Only later—beginning in the mid-4th/10th 
century—do we find attributions of the maxim to the Prophet, and 
even then, not reliably.16 
What we are left with then is this picture: In collections of traditions 
from the first three centuries AH, we find versions of the ḥudūd maxim 
that differ from what would become the standard formulation. Few 
thought those versions to be of prophetic origin and none thought the 
standard formulation to be prophetic. It is not that no one knew of the 
standard version in that early period. As elaborated below, that version 
circulated simultaneously amongst scholars familiar with versions 
13) Of the ḥadīth scholars surveyed here, Ibn Mājah is the only one who attributes the 
report to the Prophet (by way of Abū Hurayra); Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and later ḥadīth critics 
reject this version (or its attribution to the Prophet) as inauthentic because of a problematic 
link in the chain of transmission. See Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Musnad, ed. ʿ Abd Allāh al-Darwīsh 
(Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1991), 5:416; see also Appendix.
14) at is, not as a ḥadīth; it is apparent, however, that the maxim is recognized through 
language echoing the standard formula at least as early as the 3rd/9th century. See Qummī, 
Qaḍāyā, 253-4 (quoting ʿ Alī ruling’s that the ḥadd does not apply to a man accused of illicit 
sexual relations: udriʾ ʿanh al-ḥadd).
15) For a similar observation, see Maribel Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 
215-9, hypothesizing that the failure to include the maxim indicates a position against the 
practice of ḥadd avoidance. However, as I discuss below, inclusion seems less a matter of 
support than factors relating to circulation and requirements of ḥadīth-authenticity; the 
maxim was widely used in a standard form by contemporary jurists without any of them 
asserting that it was a prophetic ḥadīth. It thus makes sense that the maxim would not 
appear in canonical or any other earlier ḥadīth collections as a prophetic ḥadīth.
16) Sunnī collectors Ibn ʿAdī (d. 365/976), Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995), and Bayhaqī (d. 458/ 
1066) record chains that attribute the ḥadīth mostly to Companions. Ismāʿīlī collector 
Qāḍī Nuʿmān (d. 363/974) lists no chain, and Imāmī collector Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991-
2) attributes the saying to the Prophet without a chain. Whenever there is some hint of 
prophetic attributions, ḥadīth critics typically assail them for weak links in the chains of 
transmission.
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 contained in the books of both ḥadīth and law. Instead, traditionists of 
the early period affirmatively regarded these statements as non-pro-
phetic. Where then did they come from?
B. Scholarly Perspectives on the Ḥudūd Maxim as a Ḥadīth
Joseph Schacht and Maribel Fierro astutely have doubted the prophetic 
provenance that later jurists attached to the ḥudūd maxim as a ḥadīth. 
Accordingly, they engage in critical attempts to locate its origins by 
time and place.17
Schacht traces its origins to second-century Kufa. According to his 
common link theory, the report would have been introduced in the 
time of the famous Medinese traditionist Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/ 
742); he is the lowest common link in a chain that proliferates from 
him to Yazīd b. Ziyād and other Kufan traditionists.18 Zuhrī, Yazīd, or 
later traditionists would have initiated and consistently spread the chain 
leading up to Zuhrī because the earlier “fictitious part” (i.e., the Pro-
phet—ʿĀʾisha—ʿUrwa—Zuhrī) was regarded as particularly strong and 
reliable, thereby lending authority to the statement appended to a reli-
able ḥadīth chain. Moreover, one might add that at least some early 
transmitters of this ḥadīth should have come from Medina, where the 
17) Joseph Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) 
180-9 (section on “Legal Maxims: Pt. 2, Ch. 6); Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets 
Doubt.”
18) See Appendix (isnād map). Schacht posits that a common link in transmission chains 
indicates that a report emerged at the time of the common link and was later attached to 
more authentic chains of diﬀerent versions of the same report. Finding that most common 
links occur in the ﬁrst half of the 2nd/8th century, Schacht concluded that Islamic law could 
not have been older than that period. Schacht, Origins, 171-75. For an elaboration of this 
theory, see G.H.A. Juynboll, “Some Isnād-Analytical Methods Illustrated on the Basis of 
Several Woman-Demeaning Sayings from Ḥadīth Literature,” in Ḥadīth, ed. H. Motzki 
(Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate/Variorum, 2004), 175-216. For criticisms of this 
theory, see Motzki, Origins, 25-6; M. Mustafa al-Azami, On Schacht’s Origins of Muham-
madan Jurisprudence (Riyadh: King Saud University; New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1985), 154-205; see also G.H.A. Juynboll, Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chronology, Pro-
venance, and Authorship of Early Ḥadīth (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 214 (“e common link, if there is one, is often only a useful tool from which 
to distill an approximate chronology and possible provenance of [a] ḥadīth.”); ibid., 217 
(adding that the common link phenomenon was buried under accretions and concluding 
that it is a rarely noticeable phenomenon therefore of limited utility).
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Prophet and his followers—said to have articulated the saying—lived; 
and that if the Medinese Zuhrī indeed heard the saying from earlier 
authorities, he would not have been the only one, such that more chains 
with Medinese authorities are to be expected. The absence of non-Kufan 
transmitters in the chain, other than Zuhrī, would support Schacht’s 
idea that the statement is of Kufan stock and was projected back to 
Medinese authorities before being ascribed to the Prophet.
This absence is not, however, quite as absolute as appears from the 
chains that Schacht analyzed. When the full range of the ḥadīth collec-
tions of the period are taken into account, a slightly different picture 
emerges. Specifically, from the Medinese Zuhrī, the chain fans out to 
non-Kufan traditionists ʿUqayl and Burd.19 Nevertheless, the presence 
19) ese two traditionists are Shāmī. Abū Khālid ʿ Uqayl b. Khālid b. ʿ Aqīl (d. 144/761-2) 
is from Ayla (in present-day Aqaba, Jordan) and Abū ʾl-ʿAlāʾ Burd b. Sinān (d. 135/752) 
was originally from Damascus before he moved to Basra. See Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845), 
al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, ed. ʿ Alī Muḥammad ʿ Umar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 2001), 7:519 
(ʿUqayl); Abū ʾl-Ḥajjāj al-Mizzī (d. 742/1341), Tahdhīb al-Kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl, ed. 
Bashshār ʿ Awwād Maʿrūf (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1992), 20:242-5, no. 4000 (ʿUqayl), 
4:43-6, no. 655 (Burd); Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348), 
Tadhkirat al-ḥuﬀāẓ, ed., Zakarīyā ʿ Umayrāt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Muḥammad 
ʿAli Bayḍūn, 1998), 1:161-2 (‘Uqayl); idem, Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ, ed. Ḥusayn al-Asad 
Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1981), 6:151, no. 64 (Burd).
 Additionally, there are references to a potentially non-Kufan Yazīd b. (Abī) Ziyād, whose 
identity is confused in the sources—which variously cite him as Basran, Damascene, or 
Kufan. Further, there is a Medinese Yazīd who is confused with the Damascene one. (e 
sources are uncertain as to whether the proper name is Yazīd b. Ziyād or Yazīd b. Abī Ziyād, 
or whether those were two diﬀerent people who transmitted to and from some of the same 
traditionists.) In sum, there were four potential candidates of known traditionists named 
Yazīd b. (Abī) Ziyād who lived at the time of the one found in these chains, each from one 
of the aforementioned regions. e Yazīd in the chains for our report of the ḥudūd maxim 
is not the Basran or the Medinese, neither of whom transmitted traditions to prominent 
traditionist Wakīʿ b. al-Jarrāḥ as did the Yazīd in the ḥudūd maxim chains. Instead, he may 
have been the unreliable Damascene who transmitted from Zuhrī and to Muḥammad b. 
Rabīʿa, as in one chain for the ḥudūd maxim. On the Damascene Yazīd, see Ibn Abī Ḥātim 
(d. 327/939), al-Jarḥ waʾl-taʿdīl (Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿat Jamʿiyyat Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif 
al-ʿUthmāniyya, 1970), 9:262-3, no. 1109 (ḍaʿīf); Ibn ʿ Adī (d. 365/976), al-Kāmil fī ḍuʿafāʾ 
al-rijāl, ed. al-Lajna min al-Mukhtaṣṣīn bi-Ishrāf al-Nāshir (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1984), 
7:2714-5 (munkar al-ḥadīth); Ibn al-Jawzī, Kitāb al-Ḍuʿafāʾ waʾl-matrūkīn, ed. Abū al-Fidāʾ 
ʿAbd Allāh al-Qāḍī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1986), 3:209, no. 3781; Mizzī, 
Tahdhīb, 32:134-35 (munkar al-ḥadīth); Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Tahdhīb al-Tahdhīb, ed. 
Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭāʾ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 11:285, no. 8037. 
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of an overwhelming majority of Kufan transmitters after the early Medi-
nese part of the chain (as noted, the Prophet—ʿĀʾisha—ʿUrwa—Zuhrī) 
suffices for Schacht’s point that the maxim may have originated or at 
least proliferated most pronouncedly in Kufa.
Schacht believed this scenario to reflect a trend shared by many legal 
maxims, generally as sayings of Iraqi origin.20 For him, Kufan traditions 
of this type were normally ascribed to Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. ca. 96/ 
717), as here, then projected back to Ibn Masʿūd and earlier authorities 
all the way back to the Prophet. But his stated assumptions about early 
Islamic law led him to conclude that any such ascription to Ibrāhīm 
must have been categorically false, as was the ascription of any ḥadīth 
with legal import to any figure in the 1st century AH. For Schacht, 
Islamic law—and especially criminal law21—was too unsophisticated 
to have “be[en] possible in the first century;” non-ritual law was 
non-existent; and consequently any figure or legal doctrine attributed 
to that period, he “dismiss[ed] ... as legendary.”22 Accordingly, this 
maxim could not be traced back to the “legendary” Ibrāhīm; instead, 
at most, it was attributed to him by his pupil, Ḥammād b. Abī Sulaymān 
(d. 120/738), whom Schacht considers the first fully historical Iraqi 
He may also have been the reliable Kufan, who transmitted from Zuhrī and to Wakīʿ, as 
noted in most chains for the ḥudūd maxim. On the Kufan Yazīd, see Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ 
waʾl-taʿdīl, 9:262, no. 1107; Mizzī, Tahdhīb, 32:130-1, no. 6988; Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb 
al-Tahdhīb, 11:284, no. 8035. is puzzle about just which Yazīd it was is an example of 
the proliferation of names on the basis of corruptions in oral and written transmission 
(though there were often other reasons for confusion); it was frequently impossible to tell 
which traditionist was meant when copying ḥadīths from written works. Accordingly, here, 
it is impossible to tell conclusively which of the Yazīds the traditionists thought transmitted 
the text—the Damascene or the Kufan, the son of Ziyād or Abū Ziyād—as these lived at 
the same time and place, transmitted to some of the same traditionists, and thus were 
regularly confused in the sources.
20) Schacht, Origins, 184 (describing “a considerable number of legal maxims”).
21) Idem, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 187 (“ere 
exists ... no general concept of penal law in Islam. e concepts of guilt and criminal 
responsibility are little developed, that of mitigating circumstances does not exist; any 
theory of attempt, of complicity, of concurrence is lacking. On the other hand, the theory 
of punishments, with its distinction of private vengeance, ḥadd punishments, taʿzīr, and 
coercive and preventative measures, shows a considerable variety of ideas.”) (emphasis in 
original).
22) Idem, Origins, 235-36.
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jurist and the “foremost representative of the Kufian Iraqian school in 
the generation preceding Abū Ḥanīfa.”23 He concludes that the trajec-
tory of the maxim must have been as follows:
e maxim ‘restrict ḥadd punishments as much as possible’ started as an 
anonymous saying, was then ascribed to the ‘Companions and Successors’ 
in general, then to a number of individual Companions, and ﬁnally to the 
Prophet ... . e maxim cannot be older than the end of the period of the 
Successors. As an anonymous slogan, the maxim is introduced with the words 
‘they used to say’; this is one of the formulas used of ancient opinions.24
In a recent review of Schacht’s theories on this maxim, Fierro agrees 
with his placement of the maxim in Kufa but disagrees with his conclu-
sions about dating:
I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to conciliate what Schacht says in the section on Ibrāhīm 
al-Nakhaʿī with what he had said earlier [in his chapter on legal maxims]. If 
the legal maxim “restrict ḥadd punishments as much as possible” belongs to 
the realm of “ancient opinions” circulated by the end of the period of the 
Successors, then Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. ca. 96/717) could well have transmit-
ted it on his own (hence the fact that he used the [anonymous] formula kāna 
yuqālu) and Ḥammād just took it from him. us, I see no problem in 
considering that the legal maxim already circulated at the times of Ibrāhīm 
al-Nakhaʿī.25
Unlike Schacht, Fierro distinguishes between two iterations of the 
maxim—one that advocates ḥudūd avoidance “as much as you can” (mā 
ʾstaṭaʿtum) and another—the standard version—that invokes it in the 
presence of “doubt and ambiguities” (biʾl-shubahāt).26 In this way, she 
23) Ibid., 237-40 (quoted and discussed in Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 
221).
24) Ibid., 184 (cited and discussed in Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 220).
25) Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 221.
26) Her more detailed categories diﬀer from mine, see ibid., 219-20, but this basic dis-
tinction is germane to the discussion here. I would group the ḥadīth versions into three 
broad categories of content. e ﬁrst prescribes ḥudūd avoidance given some “exculpating 
cause” or “to the extent possible,” as in versions 1, 3, and 5, which have questionable 
attributions to Ibn Masʿūd or to Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī. e second category requires ḥudūd 
avoidance typically in the presence of shubha or shubahāt, as in versions 4, 6, and 7, with 
questionable attributions to the three Companions Ibn Masʿūd, Muʿādh b. Jabal, and ʿ Uqba 
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concludes that the dating was different from the one that Schacht would 
have proposed had he made this distinction and seen to which end the 
jurists employed each. In other words, Fierro argues that Schacht, if he 
allowed the possibility of a first-century dating, would have agreed with 
her dating had he noticed this distinction between versions.
The distinction is important, as we can observe jurists referencing 
the latter version rather than the former. If we were to take Schacht’s 
translation “restrict ḥadd punishments as much as possible” (emphasis 
added) as an indication of the version of the maxim that he was review-
ing, then he missed the presence and thus import of the existence of 
two different formulations. More likely, he merely adopted a single 
translation of the various formulations of the ḥadīth-cum-maxim. This 
we can assume, because we know that he had access to sources referenc-
ing both formulations, as in Abū Yūsuf ’s Kitāb al-Kharāj. Accordingly, 
when he referred to Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, he seems to have had in mind 
either the “as much as you can” or the biʾl-shubahāt version, without 
distinguishing between the two; and on his theory, either or both would 
be the oldest form(s) of the maxim as one of the anonymous “ancient 
sayings.” While such conflation may be a reasonable strategy in some 
contexts where a single ḥadīth has different wording, here, it obscures 
a material difference. Fierro has one view of the importance of disag-
gregating the two for dating, and my study takes another view of the 
significance of this distinction for early Islamic legal practices.
For Fierro, the “as much as you can” version came first, and the 
“doubts and ambiguities” version followed later in an attempt to curtail 
the arbitrariness of the former. In her estimation, ḥudūd avoidance was 
b. ʿĀmir (version 4) and with other attributions to Zuhrī (version 6) or ʿUmar (version 7). 
e third category combines the ﬁrst two and/or oﬀers a rationale for ḥudūd avoidance, as 
in versions 2 and 8. Version 2 is noteworthy because it becomes the most oft-cited (in later 
works) and most widely diﬀused, with eight independent chains in contrast to the single 
chains of all other versions. is version combines the “as much as possible” and “ambiguity” 
language with a rationale explaining why ḥudūd sanctions should be avoided. It alone 
appears at all levels of the ḥadīth collections—the pre-canonical, canonical, and post-
canonical collections of ʿ Abd al-Razzāq, Ibn Abī Shayba, Tirmidhī, Dāraquṭnī, and Bayhaqī; 
it also appears in juristic works as early as Abū Yūsuf ’s Kitāb al-Kharāj. Most ḥadīth scholars 
reject the single strands connecting any version of the ḥadīth back to the Prophet, but ﬁnd 
that the attributions to ʿĀʾisha or later transmitters, such as Zuhrī, or jurists, like Ibrāhīm 
al-Nakhaʿī, to be sound. For details, see Appendix.
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quickly linked with “concern for people of high social standing,” which 
“must have been influential in the formulation of the principle idraʾū 
al-ḥudūd bi-l-shubuhāt.” With this concern at the back of the minds of 
the elite, she elaborates, “[t]he only way for Muslims of high social 
status to escape the ḥudūd penalties was to create a culture of indulgence 
in which every possible means was to be used in order to avoid the 
punishment, as reflected in the [“as much as you can”] formula ... .”27 
To that end, she relates several stories from later historical reports that 
she takes as proof that “the general and indiscriminate import of that 
saying ... was the oldest formula ... .”28
She then describes a sea change:
By the second half of the second/eighth century, that formula must have 
been seen as no longer acceptable: ḥudūd had to be taken seriously, especially 
under pressure from the ‘pious opposition’ ... . A new wording was necessary, 
one that eliminated its indiscriminate and arbitrary character, while still 
allowing for possible ways of escaping the penalty, especially when a clever 
jurist was able to ﬁnd a ‘hole’ in the law.29
She postulates that this led to the Ḥanafī circulation of the standard 
formula (idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt) in Kufa. As corroborating evi-
dence, she relies on two central observations. First, the standard version 
“is explicitly associated with the two most important pupils of Abū 
Ḥanīfa, Zufar and Abū Yūsuf”—who continued to benefit from the 
earlier and more flexible formulation.30 Second, this version comes at 
times with a telling addendum instructing judges to overlook the faults 
of those of high station. In sum, she concludes, elite Ḥanafī jurists who 
stood to benefit from a broad disregard of ḥudūd laws are the ones 
responsible for circulating the maxim, and “concern for [such] people 
of high social standing ... must have been influential in the formulation” 
of the maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth with the standard formula (idraʾū 
ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt).31 Before addressing these ideas in detail, we turn 
27) Ibid., 236 (idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd ʿan al-muslimīn mā ʾstaṭaʿtum). 
28) Ibid.
29) Ibid.
30) Ibid., 222-6, esp. 222-3 (discussing Zufar’s case); see also ibid., 231-2 (discussing Abū 
Yūsuf ’s case).
31) Ibid., 222, 236.
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to the view of the maxim amongst Ḥanafīs, and importantly, other 
jurists as well. The aim is to provide a framework for assessing theories 
of the maxim’s dating and function.
III. e Ḥudūd Maxim amongst Early Jurists 
A. Ḥanafīs and the Use of the Maxim in Iraq 
Abū Ḥanīfa’s circle expounded and applied the maxim early on in the 
form that has been popularized amongst most subsequent jurists: idraʾū 
ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt. But it is not clear that they did so because of a 
concern with social class, and it seems very clear that they were not the 
ones concerned with producing a prophetic attribution. The sources 
suggest that Abū Ḥanīfa himself used the maxim in this popular form, 
and we know that his principal associates applied it. Thus, Shaybānī 
adduces examples in his Kitāb al-Āthār—applying the principle and 
pointing to the position of his teacher Abū Ḥanīfa, who in turn drew 
on opinions of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī.32 Also, as noted above, Abū Yūsuf 
mentions the popular version—alongside other versions—in his Kitāb 
al-Kharāj.33 Moreover, there are colorful stories of instances in which 
Abū Yūsuf and Zufar applied the maxim.
32) Muḥammad b. Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/804), Kitāb al-Āthār, ed. Khadīja Muḥammad 
Kāmil (Karachi: Idārat al-Qurʾān waʾl-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya, 1998-9), 136 (bāb dirāʾ [sic] 
al-ḥudūd) (citing version 2, see Appendix). Shaybānī does not mention the standard version 
in this work, where he records traditions that he learned from Abū Ḥanīfa, but tells us that 
his teacher adopted a variant of version 2, where Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī attributes the saying 
to ʿ Umar. ere is a problem in his citation: the content is consistent with ʿ Abd al-Razzāq’s 
record of a report from Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (on anonymous authority), but the chain is 
consistent with Ibn Abī Shayba’s attribution of the report to Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī from 
ʿUmar. Nevertheless, the basic point is there that Abū Ḥanīfa adopted the maxim.
33) Abū Yūsuf records several versions: a form of the standard version (which he attributes 
to “Companions and Successors”) along with a few others, for which he provides familiar 
isnāds. See Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm al-Bannāʾ (Cairo: Dār 
al-Iṣlāḥ, [1981]), 303 (Arabic text: idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt mā ʾstaṭaʿtum, waʾl-khaṭaʾ 
fī ʾ l-ʿafw khayr min al-khaṭaʾ fī ʾ l-ʿuqūba, combining the standard version with the appendage 
that appears in various ḥadīth versions (ma ʾstaṭaʿtum) plus the rationale adduced in the 
last part of version 2 (al-khaṭaʾ fī ʾl-ʿafw ...)); ibid., 305 (Arabic text: idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd ʿan 
al-muslimīn mā ʾ staṭaʿtum, fa-idhā wajadtum lil-muslim makhrajan fa-khallū sabīlahu fa-inna 
ʾl-imām la-in yukhṭiʾ fī ʾl-ʿafw khayrun lahu min an yukhṭiʾ fī ʾl-ʿuqūba, i.e., version 2, 
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 For example, in a case involving Hārūn al-Rashīd, this famous 
ʿAbbāsid caliph attempted to protect a young family member (possibly 
his son) from punishment for committing a sex crime (zinā). According 
to the story, Abū Yūsuf was a poor, orphaned, no-name jurist who came 
to Baghdad after Abū Ḥanīfa’s death. One of the local leaders had 
violated an oath, and was looking for a juristic opinion as to what to 
do in expiation for what was widely regarded as a weighty sin. When 
the leader encountered Abū Yūsuf, the jurist told him that he had not 
technically violated his oath, and no expiation was due. Pleased, the 
man gave Abū Yūsuf a sizeable sum of money and secured a house for 
him in town close to his own. 
One day, this same man went to Hārūn and found him depressed. 
The caliph explained that his sadness had to do with a religio-legal 
matter for which he needed the aid of a jurist to render an opinion, so 
the man immediately suggested Abū Yūsuf. When the latter came, he 
noticed a young man with an air of royalty who appeared to be locked 
in his room. The young man gestured at Abū Yūsuf in an appeal for 
help, but the jurist could not make out what he wanted. He proceeded 
to his appointment with the caliph. 
 “What is your opinion,” Hārūn asked, “concerning an imām who 
witnessed [another] man committing zinā; must [the perpetrator] 
receive the ḥadd punishment?” Surmising that the caliph must have 
been referring to one of his family members—the same young man 
whom he had passed on the way—Abū Yūsuf replied, “No.” Hārūn 
prostrated (in joy). Abū Yūsuf explained that his opinion was consistent 
together with the familiar isnād transmitted directly to Abū Yūsuf rather than through the 
intermediate Wakīʿ: Yazīd b. Abī Ziyād—Zuhrī—ʿUrwa—ʿĀʾisha); ibid., 303 (Arabic text: 
idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd ʿan ʿibād Allāh mā ʾstaṭaʿtum, i.e., version 3 together with the truncated 
isnād (al-Aʿmash—Ibrāhīm [al-Nakhaʿī]), as appears in Ibn Abī Shayba’s version); ibid., 
304-35 (Arabic text: la-an uʿaṭṭil al-ḥudūd fī ʾl-shubahāt aḥabb (or khayr) min an uqīmahā 
fī ʾl-shubahāt, i.e., version 7, also with the isnād later identiﬁed by Ibn Abī Shayba 
(Manṣūr—Ibrāhīm (al-Nakhaʿī)—... —ʿUmar)). e saying appears in other editions with 
formulations close to the standard one, that is, using shubahāt; but this is likely an 
interpolation of what later came to be so standard that the copyist easily thought it belonged 
in the wording. See, e.g., the edition of Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa 
al-Salaﬁyya, 1347/[1929]), 181 (Arabic text: idraʾū ʾ l-ḥudūd ʿ an al-muslimīn [biʾl-shubahāt] 
mā ʾ staṭaʿtum ..., with brackets in original text and a note from the editor that the shubahāt 
phrase inside the brackets appears in a Taymūriyya manuscript of this work).
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with the Prophet’s instructions to “avoid ḥudūd punishments in cases 
of doubts or ambiguities (idraʾū ʾ l-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt).” Judicial knowl-
edge is insufficient evidence to establish a crime, he said; with no direct 
or corroborating evidence (i.e., a confession or four eye-witnesses to 
the act), the matter was sufficiently doubtful to avoid the ḥadd sanction. 
(We are reminded of Ali’s decision regarding the murder in Medina 
told at the outset, minus the intrigues and favors of royalty.) In grati-
tude, the caliph bestowed upon Abū Yūsuf a considerable amount of 
money and favor on behalf of the offending prince. According to the 
lore, this episode eventually led to Abū Yūsuf ’s judicial appointment 
and ensured his continuing elite status.34 The anecdote is obviously a 
stylized narration; its effect is to feature the ḥudūd maxim in popular 
form as prophetic.35
The maxim also appears in an episode involving Zufar b. Hudhayl 
(d. 158/774), one of the main students of Abū Ḥanīfa after the “two 
Companions” Abū Yūsuf and Shaybānī. For Zufar, the maxim became 
a cause for opprobrium on the part of a man named ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. 
Ziyād. According to the story, when he encountered Zufar, ʿAbd 
al-Wāḥid rebuked him by saying that “you all [i.e., Zufar and the early 
Ḥanafīs] have circulated a saying (ḥadīth) amongst the people that is 
laughable.” “And what is that?” Zufar asked. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid responded 
that “you say ‘idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt,’ but when you are faced 
with the most significant (or harshest) punishments, you rule that they 
are to be imposed despite the existence of shubahāt.” Zufar asked, “How 
34) is story is repeated relatively frequently in the literary sources. See Qāḍī al-Tanūkhī 
(d. 384/994), Nishwār al-muḥāḍara wa-akhbār al-mudhākara, ed. ʿ Abbūd al-Shāljī (Beirut: 
Dār Ṣādir, 1971-73), 252-4 (for an English translation, see D.S. Margoliouth trans., e 
Table Talk of a Mesopotamian Judge (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1922), 136-7); see also 
Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282), Wafayāt al-aʿyān (Beirut: Dār al-aqāfa, [1968]), 6:381-82; 
Ibn al-Wardī (d. 749/1349), Taʾrīkh Ibn al-Wardī (Najaf: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Ḥaydariyya, 1969), 
1:281 (reporting this event under the year 181 AH); see also Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Yāﬁʿī (d. 
768/1366-7), Mirʾāt al-jinān wa-ʿibrat al-yaqẓān fī maʿrifat ḥawādith al-zamān (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī lil-Maṭbūʿāt, 1390/1970), 1:383 (quoting Ibn Khallikān and reporting 
this event under the year 182 AH).
35) Scholars recently have taken note of this story in contexts discussing the ḥudūd maxim. 
See Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 231-2; Christian Lange, Justice, Pun-
ishment and the Medieval Muslim Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 192.
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so?” ʿAbd al-Wāḥid responded, “The Prophet said that a Muslim is not 
to be put to death for the homicide of a non-Muslim (kāfir), but you 
say that he is, in the case of dhimmīs.” Here, Zufar is said to have 
retracted an early Ḥanafī ruling that a Muslim could receive the death 
penalty for intentionally killing a non-Muslim.36
* * *
Fierro uses such cases recounting the application of the ḥudūd maxim 
to develop a theory that the maxim was a principle employed (or per-
haps designed) to benefit the upper-class and that this was done under 
the aegis of prophetic attribution. Thus, it serves as a boon for Abū 
Yūsuf personally and professionally, and it is food for thought for Zufar 
concerning an outlying early Ḥanafī position. But there are good rea-
sons to discount the prophetic attribution in Abū Yūsuf ’s story. It is 
told some two centuries after the events it relates at a time when the 
maxim, as we shall see, is firmly embedded in Islamic tradition as pro-
phetic.37 Abū Yūsuf does not himself refer to the maxim as a prophetic 
saying in his Kitāb al-Kharāj. There, the maxim is an anonymous say-
ing in its standard formula and is otherwise attributed to Companions 
in different formulations, through various chains of transmission. As 
for Zufar, Fierro wonders whether ʿAbd al-Wāḥid chastised Zufar 
because of his associates’ incoherent application of the maxim or because 
of their (presumed) prophetic attribution. So far as I can tell, this ques-
tion does not seem to arise here, as Zufar does not attribute the saying 
to the Prophet in the story. ʿAbd al-Wāḥid refers to the saying as a 
ḥadīth, but there is no indication that he means this in the later Sunnī 
technical sense of the term as a prophetic statement. Instead, we must 
36) Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī, al-Sunan al-kubrā, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭāʾ (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 8:31, no. 15,700; see also Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 
748/1348), Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ, ed. Ḥusayn al-Asad Shuʿayb al-Arnaʾūṭ (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1981), 8:40-1 (entry for Zufar b. Hudhayl, reporting the story as 
related by ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mahdī [d. 198/813]). Fierro cites this same story as it appears 
in Dhahabī. Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 222 (citing Dhahabī, Siyar, 
8:38-41, as well as Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:31). For the early Ḥanafī rule that a Muslim is eligible 
for the death penalty for killing a non-Muslim, see Shaybānī, Āthār, 218-9 (mentioning 
muʿāhad, naṣrānī, yahūdī, from the ﬁrst three caliphs; and mājūs according to Abū Ḥanīfa).
37) is is outlined in Parts IV and V below. For citations of the maxim as a prophetic 
ḥadīth in other non-legal works, see Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 226.
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conclude that Abū Ḥanīfa and his associates most likely cited and dis-
cussed the maxim in its standard form as an anonymous saying (as did 
Abū Yūsuf in Kitāb al-Kharāj, his teacher Abū Ḥanīfa, and his teacher’s 
teacher Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī). There is no reliable evidence that they 
attributed it to the Prophet. All contemporaneous indications suggest 
that they did not. What is certain is that this was a legal maxim that 
was applied by Ḥanafīs in Kufa, as Schacht and Fierro concluded. Did 
it spread beyond their circle?
B. Other Early Jurists
Sources indicate that the maxim was applied elsewhere in Iraq, Syria, 
the Ḥijāz, and the other major centers of the Islamic world.38 In Iraq, 
the maxim found broad application by Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), 
a contemporary of Abū Ḥanīfa and his associates, who operated outside 
of their circle in Iraq and was considered to be a  founder of his own 
school. He held, for instance, that the ḥadd punishment for fornica-
tion or adultery (zinā) is to be averted from a man who has intimate 
relations with his mukātaba (a slavewoman who has a contract for 
freedom and for whom relations with her master are thus illicit).39 He 
also said that the same ḥadd punishment is to be avoided by reason of 
shubha from a man who has sexual relations with a slavewoman whom 
38) ough early sources for practices in Mecca and Syria are sparser than those for Medina 
and Iraq, there are indications that jurists followed practices of ḥudūd avoidance in cases 
of doubt there as well. For example, ʿAbd al-Razzāq tells us that ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (r. 
99-101/717-720), who lived in Medina and then in Syria, along with some others, avoided 
determining that there was ḥadd liability for zinā in the case of a woman who married (or 
had intimate relations with) her slave, though this was prohibited by ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb 
and ʿ Aṭāʾ. She had been married before, and so she was eligible for the stoning punishment 
for zinā. As such, ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz declared that he would have stoned her if it were 
not for her ignorance of the law; instead, he commanded her to sell the slave to someone 
who would remove him far from the vicinity. ʿAbd al-Razzāq, al-Muṣannaf fī ʾl-ḥadīth, ed. 
Ḥabīb al-Aʿẓamī (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1392/1972), 7:210. Wakīʿ (d. 306/918) also 
cites instances of ḥudūd avoidance on the part of the Syrian Umayyad judge Faḍāla b. 
ʿUbayd al-Anṣārī, for instance. Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, ed. Saʿīd Muḥammad al-Laḥḥām 
(Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 2001), 617. Similar instances of Awzāʿī’s practices in this regard 
appear in Ibn Qudāma’s Mughnī and Ibn Ḥazm’s Muḥallā.
39) ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Muṣannaf (1972), 8:430 (yudraʾ ʿanh al-ḥadd).
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he purchased with capital supplied by his business partner.40 No ḥadd 
sanction would be due in either case because both defendants would 
have gained partial ownership of the slavewomen and thus would have 
had a reasonable basis for believing that sexual relations with each were 
licit. There are several other scenarios to which Thawrī applied the 
maxim, often in a way that closely echoed the language of the standard 
formula.41
Medinese jurists also applied the maxim. Mālik invoked it, holding 
that the ḥadd punishment for zinā is to be avoided where a man has 
sex with a slavewoman without having the full ownership interest that 
would pe rmit him to do so legally.42 Another instance of ḥudūd-
avoidance concerned the question of whether a man incurs ḥadd liabil-
ity for zinā in a case where he denies that he consummated his marriage 
despite his having been alone with his wife after the wedding. If he did 
consummate the marriage and then was proved to have had intimate 
relations with another woman, the act would be adultery and the pun-
ishment stoning; if not, the act would be fornication and the punish-
ment flogging. Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 191/806), Mālik’s student and the 
most important jurist in forming early Andalusian Mālikī law, told 
Saḥnūn, who transmitted the version of the Mudawwana in which this 
story appears, that Mālik did not speak to this precise issue, but that 
on a related matter, he had cited the ḥudūd maxim in its popular form 
(idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt) on anonymous authority. Applying that 
principle here, Ibn al-Qāsim noted that, by the operation of this maxim, 
the ḥadd punishment is to be avoided until and unless the accused 
40) Ibid., 8:255 (duriʾa ʿanh al-ḥadd biʾl-shubha).
41) In many of these cases, he applied the principle without citing the maxim or language 
close to it. For instance, he avoided imposing the ḥadd punishment on a man who 
consummated a marriage with a woman who never agreed to the marriage in the ﬁrst place 
and where there were no witnesses or any other signs of a valid marriage, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 
Muṣannaf (1972), 6:207. For other instances of awrī’s ḥadd-avoidance, see Muḥammad 
Rawwās al-Qalʿahjī, Mawsūʿat ﬁqh Sufyān al-awrī (Beirut: Dār al-Nafāʾis, 1990), 241-4.
42) See Mālik b. Anas, Muwaṭṭaʾ, narration of Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā al-Laythī, ed. Bashshār ʿ Awwād 
Maʿrūf (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1996), 3:393 (holding that if a man permits his 
slavewoman to have sex with another man, even though this is illegal, the ḥadd punishment 
is to be avoided: duriʾa ʿanh al-ḥadd, and that if a man has sex with his son or daughter’s 
slavewoman also, the ḥadd sanction is to be avoided: yudraʾ ʿanh al-ḥadd).
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admits to consummating the marriage or until and unless witnesses can 
be found to testify to such an admission.43
In Egypt, we also find that Shāfiʿī applied the maxim. For example, 
in his Kitāb al-Umm, he invokes it in a case of conflicting testimony 
concerning stolen goods. If a thief steals and four witnesses testify 
against him, two saying that th e item stolen was a certain garment of 
one value and the other two saying that it was a different garment of 
some other value, does the ḥadd punishment for theft (hand amputa-
tion) apply? On the one hand, the two sets of testimony are sufficient 
to establish that the thief has committed a crime, but on the other hand, 
the conflict creates a doubt as to which item was stolen. In such cases, 
Shāfiʿī held, the punishment is waived “because we avoid ḥudūd punish-
ments in cases of doubt,” and this is a “strong” case of doubt.44 However, 
the thief does not get off scot-free; he is to pay the lesser of the two 
values in restitution to the owner.45 Also in Egypt, al-Layth b. Saʿd is 
said to have applied the maxim as well, though without citation to its 
popular form.46 
43) Saḥnūn, al-Mudawwana al-kubrā (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), 16:236 (yuqāl idraʾū ʾ l-ḥudūd 
biʾl-shubahāt); see also ibid., 16:276 (used in a similar formula (qad qīla idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd 
biʾl-shubahāt) in considering whether grandparents could be held liable for stealing money 
from their grandchildren).
44) Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Shāﬁʿī (d. 204/820), Kitāb al-Umm, ed. Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn 
Ḥassūn (n.p.: Dār Qutayba, 1996), 7:52-3 (min qibal annā nudriʾ al-ḥudūd biʾl-shubha 
wa-hādhā aqwā mā yudraʾ bih al-ḥadd). Shāﬁʿī spent time ﬁrst in the Ḥijāz, then Iraq and 
Yemen, and the end of his days in Egypt; his Umm is based on his older work written in 
Baghdad, al-Ḥujja, and it contains his later, sometimes revised, opinions in the ﬁqh 
chapters. His application of the ḥudūd maxim may well go back to his earlier opinions in 
the Ḥijāz—where he studied under Mālik, amongst others—or Iraq—where he interacted 
with prominent members of ahl al-raʾy—both of whom employed the maxim.
45) Ibid.
46) Al-Layth b. Saʿd (d. 175/791), who was highly regarded by Shāﬁʿī, was called the “Imām 
of Egypt” during his lifetime. He received his ﬁqh training in Mecca and Medina (under 
Mālik) but subsequently charted his own path. He is said to have avoided imposing ḥudūd 
punishments when a perpetrator was ignorant of the illegality of the crime, e.g., a man 
marrying two sisters or taking on a ﬁfth wife (see Ibn Ḥazm, al-Muḥallā biʾl-āthār, ʿAbd 
al-Ghaﬀār Sulaymān al-Bindārī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1988), 11:247) (cited 
in Qalʿahjī, 218), or taking money from the spoils of war to which he was not entitled (see 
Muwaﬀaq al-Dīn Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and 
ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw (Cairo: Hajr, 1986), 8:470; Muḥammad b. Aḥmad 
al-Qurṭubī, al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-Shaʿb, [1961?]), 4:260), because of 
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In Baghdad some decades later, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal cited the maxim. 
In the form of a prophetic ḥadīth, he thought—like other early ḥadīth 
scholars—that the saying was of dubious authenticity. He noted none-
theless that the Prophet had applied the principle to a woman suspected 
of zinā who claimed she was raped. That is, the Prophet declined to 
punish her for having illicit sexual relations given the possibility of a 
lack of voluntariness on her part.47 It is unclear whether Ibn Ḥanbal 
regarded this report from the perspective of a ḥadīth scholar or a jurist, 
and this ambivalence later reveals itself in his school’s traditionist juris-
prudence, which—as we will see—takes on differing degrees of oppo-
sition to the ḥudūd maxim (at least as a prophetic ḥadīth).
Finally, the maxim is attested in the ʿAlid community in Kufa as 
well.48 It is listed in the works of ʿAlī’s judgments collected there in the 
third century. In one case, a man gave his wife a slavewoman and then 
had sex with her. When the woman complained to ʿAlī, accusing her 
husband of illicit sexual relations, it became apparent to her that the 
man was eligible for the ḥadd sanction. Fearing the harsh consequences 
against him, she fell on her sword—perjuring herself, retracting the 
testimony, and thereby avoiding the ḥadd punishment.49
* * *
The preceding discussion indicates that the maxim was widely applied 
in the major regions of the Muslim community where the law was 
the presence in each case of a doubt as to culpability. In the ﬁrst cases, ignorance of the 
law diminishes culpability for clearly prohibited acts, while in the last case, the fact that a 
man has some ownership interest in the spoils of war exculpates him from the accusation 
of stealing from property to which he is not entitled at all.
47) Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, 5:416. 
48) For discussion of the canonical Shīʿī ḥadīth collections, see below, note 62.
49) See Qummī, Qaḍāyā, 253-4 (fa-udriʾ ʿanh al-ḥadd). One source has it that ʿAlī advised 
his faithful companion, Mālik al-Ashtar, to follow the wisdom of the ḥudūd maxim, in a 
celebrated letter of investiture and advice upon sending him to be governor of Egypt. See 
Ibn Shuʿba (d. end of the 4th/10th or 5th/11th century), Tuḥaf al-ʿuqūl, ed. ʿAlī Akbar 
al-Ghaﬀārī (Tehran: Maktabat al-Ṣadūq, 1376): 126-49, 128. is source is dubious, and 
the maxim does not appear in the “canonical” version of the letter recorded in al-Sharīf 
al-Raḍī (d. 406/1015), Nahj al-balāgha, ed. Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 
1967), 426-45, letter no. 53. At most, this indicates that the maxim was known in the 
circles that the relatively unknown ﬁgure Ibn Shuʿba frequented in the 4th/10th or 5th/11th 
century.
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elaborated. Several jurists relied on the standard version, but none of 
them understood it to be a prophetic ḥadīth—at a time when most 
ḥadīth scholars doubted its prophetic attributions and jurists did not 
bother to cite any. This is particularly striking in the case of Shāfiʿī, 
whose work of legal theory, al-Risāla, emphasizes appeals to textual 
sources (Qurʾān and ḥadīth, especially, as well as consensus).50 If his 
insistence on these bases is taken at face value to be an indispensable 
feature of his jurisprudence, we would expect him to attribute the 
maxim to the Prophet if he thought it was a ḥadīth or else to rely on it 
as an expression of consensus. His use of the maxim without such 
attribution may be taken as an indication that he did not believe it to 
be a prophetic ḥadīth. He instead applied it as a legal maxim grounded 
in other authority, perhaps a type of implicit consensus. On this ac -
count, he would have taken the maxim to express a self-evident or 
self-authenticating practice reflecting the consensus of common prec-
edent.
Numerous reports indicate that there was a widespread practice of 
ḥudūd avoidance that predated the jurists of the end of the 1st and 2nd 
centuries AH, during the time when we have firm textual-historical 
evidence of juristic uses of the maxim (that is, beginning with Ibrāhīm 
al-Nakhaʿī). It is perhaps on that basis that Shāfiʿī and others avoided 
ḥudūd punishments in certain situations, following the earlier wide-
spread practice.51 This would explain why, in applying the principle, 
Shāfiʿī simply says that “we avoid ḥudūd punishments in cases of ambi-
guity” (emphasis added), indicating that this is an axiomatic, widely 
50) See Shāﬁʿī, Risāla, ed. Muḥammad Nabīl Ghanāyim and ʿAbd al-Ṣabūr Shāhīn (Cairo: 
Markaz al-Ahrām lil-Tarjama waʾl-Nashr, Muʾassasat al-Ahrām, 1988). is is not to signal 
agreement with Schacht’s assumption that a jurist will use a ḥadīth if he or she knows it. 
Rather, it is to argue precisely the opposite, by noting that there was a material change 
between early forms of authority to which jurists appealed (where there was no absolute 
need to cite principles deemed to be Sunna in the form of a prophetic ḥadīth, particularly 
where they were so widely diﬀused so as to be considered self-evident practices attested by 
continuous community practice), and a later, increasing reliance on ḥadīths used to claim 
or bolster one’s arguments against divergent views and practices. 
51) ey may have done so out of a notion that the practice traced back to the Companions 
and even the Prophet. See Jonathan Brown, “Critical Rigor vs. Juridical Pragmatism: How 
Legal eorists and Ḥadīth Scholars Approached the Backgrowth of Isnāds in the Genre 
of ʿIlal al-ḥadīth,” Islamic Law and Society 14, 1 (2008): 1-41. 
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circulating principle requiring no attribution. If accurate, this fits eas-
ily with the idea of a legal maxim in the sense of a formalized substan-
tive canon with deep—but anonymous—roots. In other words, this 
maxim is functioning, as do legal maxims in other legal spheres, as a 
kind of “super-precedent” for which specific attribution is either unnec-
essary or uncommon.
After the traditionist triumph culminating in the 4th and 5th centuries 
AH, this state of affairs changed. By then, the ḥudūd maxim had become 
the central principle of Islamic criminal law, and it usually appeared 
with new prophetic attribution amongst its proponents.
IV. Splicing Maxims for a Touch of Class 
The prophetic attributions begin in the 4th/10th century.52 As noted, 
Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995) and Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) copied the earlier 
ḥadīth versions, but the chains had by then acquired prophetic ori-
gins. During the same period, Ismāʿīlī, Sunnī, and Imāmī Shīʿī contem-
poraries recorded formulations that begin with the standard version: 
Qāḍī Nuʿmān (d. 363/974), Ibn ʿ Adī (d. 365/976), and Ibn Bābawayh 
(d. 381/991-2), respectively.53 The formulation of Qāḍī Nuʿmān and 
Ibn ʿAdī is of particular interest. At first blush, it seems to combine 
two different ideas of ḥudūd avoidance and ḥudūd enforcement. And 
the combined formulation figures into Fierro’s theory that the maxim 
emerged as a tool used originally to benefit the elite.54 The Qāḍī 
52) In another realm detailed below, that of the jurists, we ﬁnd a prophetic attribution 
in the work of Ḥanafī jurist Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa 
al-Bahiyya, [1928?]), 3:330.
53) See Qāḍī Nuʿmān, Daʿāʾim al-Islām, ed. Āṣif b. ʿ Alī Aṣghar Fayḍī (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 
1960), 2:466, no. 1653 (cited in Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Taqī al-Nūrī al-Ṭabarsī, Mustadrak 
al-Wasāʾil (Muʾassasat Āl al-Bayt li-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, [1407/1986-7], 18:26, no. 21,911)). 
For Qāḍī Nuʿmān’s biography and life as a judge in the early Fāṭimid empire, see Ismail K. 
Poonawala, “al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān and Ismāʿīlī Jurisprudence,” in Mediaeval Ismāʿīlī History 
and ought, ed. Farhad Daftary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 117-43.
54) See Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 233 (arguing that the cases she lists 
where high-status oﬀenders used the ḥudūd maxim to escape punishment provide the 
background “context [that] makes sense of Ibn ʿAdī’s variant of the saying … .” Fierro also 
uses this variant as evidence in support of her notion that the “as much as you can” for-
mulation preceded the standard version of the ḥudūd maxim (bi-ʾl-shubahāt): “By the second 
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Nuʿmān-Ibn ʿ Adī formulation goes as follows: “Avoid c riminal penalties 
in cases of doubts or ambiguities and overlook the faults of the nobles, 
except as concerns criminal penalties (idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt, 
wa-aqīlū ʾl-kirām ʿatharātihim illā fī ḥadd min ḥudūd Allāh).” The first 
part is the standard ḥudūd maxim, and we will call the second part the 
aqīlū (overlook) saying.
It is doubtful that this maxim existed in this form in the early period. 
With one known exception (discussed below), we have no contem-
poraneous reports of it, as the above survey of early traditionists and 
jurists reveals. There are questionable references to its presence in Ibn 
ʿAdī’s works; many scholars attribute the saying to one of his otherwise 
unknown writings—usually without a transmission chain—and the 
maxim is not to be found in his book on ḥadīth transmitters, al-Kāmil, 
where we might expect it.55 Signifantly, as discussed below, Qāḍī 
half of the second/eighth century, that formula [“as much as you can”] must have been seen 
as no longer acceptable: ḥudūd had to be taken seriously … . A new wording was necessary, 
one that eliminated its indiscriminate and arbitrary character, while still allowing for pos-
sible ways of escaping the penalty, especially when a clever jurist was able to ﬁnd a ‘hole’ 
in the law.” Ibid., 236. I take her to mean that the standard formulation as well as the 
combined version adduced by Ibn ʿ Adī were the new formulations that restricted the maxim 
from the “culture of indulgence in which every possible means was to be used in order to 
avoid the punishment” and prevented “Muslims of high social status to [con tinue] to escape 
the ḥudūd penalties” on the basis of the “as much as you can” formulation. Ibid.
55) e attribution of this saying to Ibn ʿAdī is problematic. ʿAynī is the earliest reference 
I have identiﬁed and the only one to give a chain of transmission (see Appendix, Version 
11), though he does not provide his source. See Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 755/1451), ʿUmdat 
al-qārī ([Cairo]: Idārat al-Ṭibāʿa al-Munīriyya, 1348/1929-30), 20:259. Several authors 
cite a work ascribed to Ibn ʿAdī with a simple attribution to Ibn ʿAbbās, e.g., Jalāl al-Dīn 
al-Suyūṭī, Jāmiʿ al-aḥādīth (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1998), 1:135, no. 793 (fī juzʾ lah min ḥadīth 
ahl Miṣr waʾl-Jazīra ʿan Ibn ʿAbbās), whence al-Muttaqī al-Hindī (d. 975/1567), Kanz 
al-ʿummāl (Aleppo: Maktabat al-Turāth al-Islāmī, 1969?), 5:309, no. 12,972 (same), and 
ʿAbd al-Raʾūf al-Munāwī, al-Taysīr: sharḥ al-jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr (lil-Suyūṭī), ed. Muṣṭafā Muḥam-
mad al-Dhahabī ([Cairo]: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2000), 1:156, no. 314 (same); Dhahabī, Siyar, 
8:36-7, note 2 (s.v. Zufar b. Hudhayl) (quoting without citing Suyūṭī [above]; also: editor’s 
note that akhrajah Ibn ʿAdī fī juzʾ lah ʿan Ibn ʿAbbās marfūʿan biʾl-lafẓ). 
 ere is some confusion among later scholars about the proper attribution and source 
of this report. For instance, though Munāwī attributes it to Ibn ʿAdī in his Taysīr when 
commenting on Suyūṭī’s al-Jamīʿ al-ṣaghīr, he mentions in his Fayḍ that ʿAbd al-Razzāq, 
rather than Ibn ʿAdī, narrates this tradition on the authority of Ibn ʿAbbās. e latter is 
incorrect if the Ṣanʿānī traditionist ʿ Abd al-Razzāq is meant, as no such attribution appears 
in his Muṣannaf. See Muḥammad Ḥasan Ḍayf Allāh, al-Fayḍ al-qadīr ([Cairo]: Maktaba 
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Nuʿmān took his attribution of this version of the ḥadīth to the Prophet 
from an earlier source that had combined the two  different sayings, 
albeit with likely inadvertence.56 Of equal significance is the fact that, 
during the same early period surveyed, both parts of this ḥadīth were 
in wide circulation as separate sayings; but the two were quite distinct 
in attribution, circulat ion, and application.
A. Attribution and Circulation: Two Diﬀerent Circles
As for attribution, we know that the ḥudūd maxim in all its versions 
was a non-prophetic saying attributed to Companions or adduced 
anonymously. Recall that, as a “ḥadīth,” it had a Kufan pedigree and 
appeared in the canonical ḥadīth collections of Ibn Mājah and Tirmidhī. 
As a maxim, it circulated widely in juristic circles (including Iraq, the 
Ḥijāz, and elsewhere) during the first three centuries AH. As detailed 
above, two principal versions of the maxim circulated alongside each 
other during that period, though with different versions among the two 
camps of traditionists and jurists. What about the aqīlū saying? 
Sunnī and Shīʿī ḥadīth literature each present largely uniform views 
of the source of the aqīlū saying, none of which accord easily with their 
records concerning the provenance of the ḥudūd maxim. In early Sunnī 
ḥadīth collections, the aqīlū saying originates with the Prophet via 
wa-Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1964), 2:142(1). e editor of Ibn Rushd’s Bayān 
also indicates that Musaddid narrated this “full” version (tamām al-ḥadīth) in his Musnad, 
attributing it to Ibn Masʿūd mawqūfan. It is not clear that he means this version. In 
addition, one commentator notes that this version of the tradition is in Ibn ʿAdī’s Kāmil. 
See the editor’s note in Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, al-Bayān waʾl-taḥṣīl, ed. Muḥammad Ḥajjī 
(Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islamī, 1984), 16:324, note 169. But my examination of al-Kāmil 
revealed no such ḥadīth in that book. See Yūsuf al-Biqāʿī, ed., Muʿjam aḥādīth ḍuʿafāʾ al-rijāl 
min Kitāb al-Kāmil (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1988) (s.v. the names of the individual narrators 
in ʿAynī’s chain); see also Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 218, note 33 
(noting that her search for this ḥadīth in al-Kāmil was inconclusive). e absence of this 
version of the ḥadīth in al-Kāmil is consistent with the fact that no other scholar cites that 
work for this report and Suyūṭī’s explicit reference to Ibn ʿAdī’s other work (juzʾ). Ibn 
Rushd’s editor seems to be quoting Suyūṭī’s reference to Ibn ʿAdī’s work mentioned in 
al-Jamīʿ al-ṣaghīr (see above); the editor uses the same language as Suyūṭī except that he 
interpolates fī ʾl-Kāmil in place of the source mentioned by Suyūṭī.
56) See below, notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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ʿĀʾisha—Abū Bakr b. ʿAmr b. Ḥazm or one of his sons.57 As for Shīʿī 
sources, Qāḍī Nuʿmān does not record the saying alone, but other Shīʿī 
ḥadīth sources do,58 attributing it to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq rather than to the 
Prophet.59 In both contexts, the chains for the aqīlū saying are wholly 
different from those of the ḥudūd maxim and from the sparse chains 
adduced for the combined version at issue.
Circulation and citation of the two statements are quite different as 
well. Amongst Sunnīs, the ḥudūd maxim and the aqīlū saying seem to 
have circulated amongst different groups of ḥadīth scholars and appear 
in completely different sets of canonical ḥadīth collections. Whereas 
the transmitters of the ḥudūd maxim indicate a Kufan origin or cir-
culation, the chains of the aqīlū saying indicate a circulation in the 
Ḥijāz (Mecca, Medina, Ṭāʾif ), usually alongside other Ḥijāzī sayings 
calling on Muslims to overlook the faults of fellow Muslims generally.60 
57) e most common versions of the aqīlū saying (aqīlū dhawī ʾ l-hayaʾāt …), are recorded 
with four diﬀerent endings in Ibn Ḥanbal, Abū Dāwūd, Nasāʾī, Bayhaqī, Ibn Ḥibbān, Ibn 
Rāhawayh, and Dāraquṭnī. Nasāʾī includes two other versions with the same chain. e 
less typical version is the one that appears in the second part of this ḥadīth (aqīlū ʾl-kirām 
ʿatharātihim …); it appears only in a few collections. e notable point here is that all 
versions of the aqīlū ḥadīth trace back to the Prophet via ʿĀʾisha—…—Abū Bakr b. ʿAmr 
b. Ḥazm or one of his close descendants (i.e., via ʿĀʾisha—ʿAmra—Muḥammad b. Abī 
Bakr and/or his father Abū Bakr b. ʿAmr b. Ḥazm, then spreading out from Abū Bakr or 
his son).
58) Daʿāʾim is the most authoritative compendium of law for most Ismāʿīlīs. It is also a 
source of Imāmī Shīʿī ḥadīth, as Qāḍī Nuʿmān recorded traditions attributed to the Imām 
Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and as some Imāmī scholars counted Qāḍī Nuʿmān as one of their own. See 
Wilferd Madelung, “e Sources of Ismāʿīlī Law,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 35 (1976): 
29-40, at 29; see also Ṭabarsī, Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, 18:26, no. 21,911 (citing Qāḍī 
Nuʿmān, Daʿāʾim, 2:466, no. 1653).
59) For example, see al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, Wasāʾil, 11:534, no. 3 (ajīzū [or aqīlū] li-ahl al-maʿrūf 
ʿatharātihim wa-ʾghﬁrū lahum fa-in kaﬀa ʾllāh ʿazza wa-jalla ʿalayhim hākadhā, wa-awmaʾa 
bi-yadih kaʾannah bi-hā yaẓull shayʿan).
60) Especially the “taʿāfaw saying,” which encourages people to overlook each other’s faults 
so long as oﬀenses have not been brought before the court, in which case adjudication and/
or punishment become mandatory. See ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Muṣannaf (1972), 10:229, no. 
18,937 (Arabic text: taʿāfaw fī-mā baynakum qabla an taʾtūnī fa-mā balaghanī min ḥadd 
fa-qad wajaba); see also Abū Dāwūd Sulaymān b. al-Ashʿath al-Sijistānī, Sunan, ed. 
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Khālidī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1996), 3:137, no. 
4376 (for an English translation, see Sunan Abu Dawud, trans. Moham mad Mahdī al-Sharīf 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2008), 5:74.); Nasāʾī, al-Sunan al-kubrā, ed. Ḥasan ʿ Abd 
al-Munʿim al-Shalabī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2001), 7:12, nos. 7331-32; Abū 
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Whereas the ḥadīth versions of the ḥudūd maxim appear in Ibn Mājah 
and Tir midhī, the aqīlū saying appears in Abū Dāwūd and Nasāʾī.61 
Neither appears in Bukhārī or Muslim. The Shīʿī evidence likewise 
suggests different realms of circulation. Versions of the ḥudūd maxim 
appear in Ibn Bābawayh’s collection, which draws on mostly Kufan 
ḥadīths reported on the authority of scholars in Qum.62 But neither he 
nor any other collector of canonical Shīʿī ḥadīth records the aqīlū say-
ing. This suggests that Qummī scholars at that time did not regard it 
as a ḥadīth, or more pointedly, as a valid principle of law.63 The two 
maxims appear together during that time in the Shīʿī sources, as noted, 
only in Qāḍī Nuʿmān’s Daʿāʾim, which draws on a collection of reports 
ʾl-Qāsim al-Ṭabarānī, al-Muʿjam al-awsaṭ, ed. Abū Maʿādh Ṭāriq b. ʿIwaḍ Allāh b. 
Muḥammad and Abū al-Faḍl ʿAbd al-Muḥsin b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥusaynī (Cairo: Dār 
al-Ḥaramayn, 1995), 6:210, no. 6212; al-Ḥākim al-Naysābūrī, al-Mustadrak ʿ alā ʾ l-Ṣaḥīḥayn 
(Cairo: Dār al-Ḥaramayn lil-Ṭibāʿa waʾl-Nashr waʾl-Tawzīʿ, 1997), 4:537, no. 8236; 
Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:575, no. 17,611. 
61) For the two citations in the Sunnī canonical collections, see Abū Dāwūd, 3:137, no. 
4375 (English translation in Sunan Abu Dawud, 5:74); Nasāʾī, Sunan, 6:468-9, nos. 7253-
58. For other contemporaneous sources and references through the 5th/11th century, see 
Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh (d. 238/853), Musnad, ed. ʿAbd al-Ghafūr b. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Balūshī 
(Medina: Maktabat al-Īmān, 1412/1990-1), 2:567; Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), Musnad, 
6:181; Abū Yaʿlā (d. 307/918), Musnad, ed. Ḥusayn Salīm Asad (Damascus: Dār al-Maʾmūn 
lil-Turāth, 1984-94), 8:363-4, no. 4953; Ibn Ḥibbān (d. 354/965), Ṣaḥīḥ, ed. Shuʿayb 
al-Arnaʾūṭ and Ḥusayn Asad, arranged by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn b. Balabān al-Fārisī (Beirut: Muʾas-
sasat al-Risāla, 1407/1987), 1:296; Ṭabarānī (d. 360/970), al-Muʿjam al-awsaṭ, 3:277, 
no. 3139; 6:54, no. 5774, 7:302, no. 7562; Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995), Sunan (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2004), 3:207; Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066), Sunan, 8:579-80, nos. 17,627-
79. For later sources, see Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 755/1451), ʿUmdat al-qārī, 14:256; 
al-Muttaqī al-Hindī (d. 975/1567), Kanz al-ʿummāl, 5:121-24.
62) Ibn Bābawayh, Kitāb man lā yaḥḍuruhu ʾl-faqīh, ed. ʿAlī Akbar al-Ghaﬀārī (Qum: 
Jamāʿat al-Mudarrisīn fī ʾl-Ḥawza al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 4:53, no. 90. See also Ṭabarsī 
(d. 1320/1902), Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, 18:26, no. 21,912 (listing the ḥudūd maxim as it 
has been popularized, attributed to ʿAlī without an isnād (from Ibn Bābawayh’s Muqniʿ, 
147). For inclusion of the saying in later collections, see Ibn Abī Jumhūr al-Aḥsāʾī 
(d. ca. late 9th/15th century), ʿAwālī al-laʾālī, ed. Mujtabā al-Arāqī (Qum: Maṭbaʿat Sayyid 
al-Shuhadāʾ, 1983-1985), 1:236; Ḥusayn al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī al-Burūjirdī, Jāmiʿ aḥādīth al-Shīʿa 
(Qum: Maṭbaʿat al-Mihr, 1992), 23:328 (citing Ibn Bābawayh, Faqīh).
63) e aqīlū saying appears elsewhere in the Shīʿī ḥadīth corpus. For example, al-Ḥurr 
al-ʿĀmilī, Wasāʾil al-Shīʿa, 11:534, records a version of the saying (citing Furūʿ [= Kulaynī, 
Kāfī]).
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from not only Kufa and sources familiar toTwelver Imāmīs, but also 
the Ḥijāz and sources circulating amongst Zaydis.64
The appearance of the aqīlū maxim in the Ḥijāz does nothing to 
support an idea of early circulation of the double maxim. The Daʿāʾim 
is an a bridged law manual rather than a ḥadīth work designed to pre-
serve legal rules in the form of authentic prophetic ḥadīths with their 
chains. For this reason, Qāḍī Nuʿmān often splices together ḥadīths of 
different provenance or omits chains altogether to support a particular 
legal proposition.65 Here, the fact that he draws on early ḥadīth collec-
tions from Iraq (where the ḥudūd maxim was circulating as a ḥadīth) 
and the Ḥijāz (where th e aqīlū maxim was found), plus the virtual 
absence of the ḥadīth in joint form in the first three centuries of the 
Islamic period, together indicate that it is quite possible that he or 
someone from whom he copied his ḥadīths placed these separate sayings 
together too. In fact, a closer examination of early Shīʿī sources dem-
onstrates that this is indeed most probably what happened.
Without transmission chains in any of his surviving works, we are 
initially uncertain whether Qāḍī Nuʿmān got the combined version of 
64) Qāḍī Nuʿmān extracted the reports in Daʿāʾim, from which he omitted transmission 
chains, mostly from his massive work of law-related ḥadīth, Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ, which gathered—
among other sayings—ḥadīth attributed to the Prophet’s family together with their trans-
mission chains. See Qāḍī Nuʿmān, Kitāb al-Iqtiṣār, ed. ʿĀrif Tāmir (Beirut: Dār al-Aḍwāʾ, 
1996), 9-10 (describing his Īḍāḥ); cf. idem, Īḍāḥ, ed. Muḥammad Kāẓim Raḥmatī (Beirut: 
Muʾassasat al-Aʿlamī lil Maṭbūʿāt, 2007) (the surviving fragments of ḥadīths on ritual law). 
See also Poonawala, “al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān,” 121, 128 (noting that he added more Zaydī and 
Mālikī components to the Daʿāʾim as well); Madelung, “Sources of Ismāʿīlī Law,” 29 (noting 
the Imāmī and Zaydī components). Kitāb al-Īḍāḥ is mostly lost, but from the surviving 
portion, Madelung reconstructed the sources from which Qāḍī Nuʿmān drew, at least in 
the extant section on ritual law, and locates them in the late second and early third centuries 
in sources circulating outside of Qum. e earliest recorded books from which he drew 
are Kitāb al-masā’il and the Jāmiʿ by ‘Ubayd Allāh b. Ḥalabī, who transmits directly from 
Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) and died in his lifetime; the last is the Kitāb of Ḥammād b. 
ʿĪsā (d. 208/823-4 or 209/824-5). Madelung, “Sources of Ismāʿīlī Law,” 30. He concludes 
that the work was a compromise between Imāmī and Zaydī law—materially based on 
authoritative sources of both but, against the Zaydī tendency, emphasizing the authority 
of the Imāms, especially that of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, over other ʿAlids. Ibid., 32.
65) Madelung, “Sources of Ismāʿīlī Law,” 29 (“He usually quotes only a single tradition on 
any question in support of actual doctrine, or simply formulates it himself … .”).
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the maxim from Sunnī or other Shīʿī sources.66 The sources suggest, at 
most, that Qāḍī Nuʿmān may have been familiar with the ḥudūd maxim 
through Sunnī67 or Imāmī68 circles. Yet a look at the Zaydī sources 
shows where he got his extended version of it.
The maxim was cited by Zaydism’s eponymous school founder, Zayd 
b. ʿAlī (d. 122/740), according to his grandson. Though it does not 
appear in the Musnad collecting ḥadīths attributed to Zayd, the maxim 
is in a work collecting his teachings, called the Amālī.69 From that work, 
we see where Qāḍī Nuʿmān copied his long version of the maxim, inas-
much as we know that he copied from written Shīʿī sources for his works 
on law ; in the Amālī, it was already a double-maxim, combined and 
66) In addition to the compound version in the Daʿāʾim, a simple version of the ḥudūd 
maxim appears in Qāḍī Nuʿmān’s al-Iqtiṣār, 108, where he simply reports at the end of the 
chapter on ḥudūd that punishments are to be avoided in cases of doubt or ambiguity 
(wa-yudraʾ al-ḥadd biʾl-shubha ...). e standard, if not compound, version thus probably 
appeared in al-Īḍāḥ and his subsequent abridgments of that work (from which all but the 
ritual law section is lost), though there is no ḥudūd maxim in his short didactic poem, 
al-Muntakhab. 
67) As for Sunnī sources—speciﬁcally the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools in which Qāḍī Nuʿmān 
is believed to have started out—we know that they regularly invoked the ḥudūd maxim 
during this time in Ifrīqiya and elsewhere. On Qāḍī Nuʿmān’s religious and legal aﬃliations, 
and “conversion” from Sunnism to Ismāʿīlī Shīʿism, see Ismail K. Poonawala, “A Recon-
sideration of al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān’s ‘Madhhab,’” Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies 37, 
3 (1974): 572-9. 
68) e Imāmīs of course have it, as Qāḍī Nuʿmān’s contemporary, Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/ 
991-2), includes it in his ḥadīth compilation. (e other compilers of the Imāmī ḥadīth 
canon, Kulaynī (d. 329/941) and Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), do not.) In principle, Qāḍī Nuʿmān 
and Ibn Bābawayh could have gotten the ḥudūd maxim from a common source available 
to both of them at the time the former wrote al-Īḍāḥ (i.e., between 297/909 and 322/934, 
during the ﬁrst Fāṭimid caliph al-Mahdī’s reign) and/or Daʿāʾim (around 349/960). On 
the dating of these texts, see Poonawala, “al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān,” 121, 126. But this was likely 
not the case, because the sources informing them as well as the versions that they cited 
diﬀered considerably. Instead, there is a more direct link between Qāḍī Nuʿmān’s version 
of the maxim and a version known in Zaydī circles.
69) See Zayd b. ʿ Alī (d. 122/740), Musnad (also called al-Majmūʿ al-ﬁqhī ), ed. ʿ Abd al-ʿAzīz 
b. Isḥāq al-Baghdādī (Ṣanʿāʾ, Yemen: Maktabat al-Irshād, 1990), 297-304 (kitāb al-ḥudūd); 
Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā b. Zayd (d. 248/869), Amālī (also called Kitāb al-ʿUlūm), collected and 
commented upon by Muḥammad b. Manṣūr b. Yazīd al-Murādī al-Kūfī ([Yemen]: Yūsuf 
b. al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Muʾayyad al-Ḥusnī?, 1401/1981), 211. See also ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl 
al-Ṣanʿānī, Kitāb Raʾb al-ṣadʿ (Beirut 1990), 3:1390-1405 (preserving Aḥmad b. ʿ Īsā’s Amālī, 
with commentary). 
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attributed to the Prophet: qāla Rasūl Allāh [s.a.w.] idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-
shubahāt wa-aqīlū ʾl-kirām ʿatharātihim illā min ḥadd. From the chain, 
we know that the ḥadīth was copied from a book.70 It seems to have 
been not uncommon for ḥadīths of similar topics like these to have 
appeared side by side in early notebooks and for later copyists to divide 
the run-togther ḥadīths sometimes incorrectly, as here, and attribute 
them together to the Prophet and as if through an independent chain 
of transmission, also as here. In other words, Qāḍī Nuʿmān did not do 
the splicing; he copied from an earlier Zaydī work where the ḥadīths 
were already conjoined—perhaps inadvertently—and attributed to the 
Prophet.71
* * *
A similar process may have occurred in the Sunnī context, where there 
is a general lack of overlap between the ḥudūd maxim and the aqīlū 
70) Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā b. Zayd, Amālī, 211 (recording the following chain: Muḥammad—
Ḥusayn b. Naṣr—Khālid—Ḥuṣayn [b. Mukhāriq]—Jaʿfar [al-Ṣādiq]—his father  [M uḥam-
mad al-Bāqir]). Cf. Hossein Modarressi, Tradition and Survival: A Bibliographical Survey 
of Early Shīʿite Literature (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 275-6 (noting that Abū Junāda 
al-Salūlī [Ḥuṣayn in the above chain], a late 2nd/8th century Kufan transmitter of ḥadīth 
from Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq [as appears in the above chain] and Mūsā al-Kāẓim with strong Shīʿī 
leanings, authored a work called Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-ʿilm, and that this work appears to have 
been quoted extensively in Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā’s Amālī, always through the same chain of trans-
mission; that chain of transmitters [Ḥusayn b. Naṣr b. al-Muzāḥim—Khālid—al-Ḥuṣayn 
(b. Mukhāriq)], i.e., the same one noted in our copy of Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā’s Amālī, referred to 
ḥadīths taken from this work). 
71) Furthermore, we know that the simple version of the ḥudūd maxim was circulating in 
the Zaydī community at a point contemporary to Qāḍī Nuʿmān, as the Imām al-Hādī ilā 
ʾl-Ḥaqq (d. 298/911)—although rejected by later Zaydīs—appealed to it during his life-
time, though without citing it as a ḥadīth and not in compound form. See Muḥammad b. 
Sulaymān al-Kūfī (d. after 399/921), Muntakhab (Ṣanʿāʾ: Dār al-Ḥikma al-Yamāniyya, 
1993), 413, 416. As a general matter, the maxim was not compound at that time and it 
did not appear as a Prophetic ḥadīth in most Zaydī works until the modern period. Compare 
Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437), Kitāb al-Azhār and al-Baḥr al-zakhkhār in addition to 
al-Nāṭiq biʾl-Ḥaqq’s Kitāb al-Taḥrīr (no citations to the maxim in any of these works), with 
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī’s Nayl al-awṭār, eds. Muḥammad Ḥallāq and ʿIzz al-Dīn 
Khaṭṭāb (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1999), 7:109, and Ṣanʿānī, Kitāb Raʾb 
al-ṣadʿ, 3:1390, 1393, 1405 (citations to the maxim, though not as a ḥadīth). On modern 
Zaydīs, and particularly Shawkānī’s appropriation of Sunnī ḥadīths (as he does here with 
the ḥudūd maxim), see Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: e Legacy of Muḥam-
mad al-Shawkānī (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). (anks are 
due to Najam Haider for directing me to several Zaydī sources.)
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saying. As noted above, jurists of the early period regularly cited and 
applied the ḥudūd maxim.72 But they rarely, if ever, cited or applied the 
aqīlū saying to validate the practice of avoiding criminal sanctions when 
it came to the elite.73 This saying is missing in the works of Ibn Abī 
Shayba, ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Shāfiʿī, Abū Yūsuf, Mālik, and most others 
who wrote or recorded juristic opinions during that period. One of the 
few traditionist-jurists of the period to mention the aqīlū saying, Ibn 
Rāhawayh (d. 238/853), records it but not the ḥudūd maxim.74 
Exceptionally, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (another traditionist-jurist who 
postdates the other major Sunnī school-“founding” jurists by some 
decades) records both maxims, having grappled with but overcome the 
incompatibility problems between them. He rejects the prophetic attri-
bution of the ḥudūd-avoidance ḥadīth and is ambivalent about whether 
ḥudūd punishments ever could or should be avoided.75 But he supports 
a particular version of the aqīlū saying that is at odds with the lenient 
one cited by Ibn Rāhawayh. As with the ḥudūd-avoidance maxim, there 
72) Jurists like Shāﬁʿī, Abū Yūsuf and Mālik, in addition to traditionist compilers of law-
related ḥadīth like ʿAbd al-Razzāq and Ibn Abī Shayba, record and show applications of 
the ḥudūd-avoidance ḥadīth but not the aqīlū saying. See above section on the early jurists.
73) Abū Bakr b. Muḥammad b. ʿAmr b. Ḥazm, a Medinese judge and ḥadīth scholar under 
ʿUmar II, is said to have promulgated the ḥadīth in Medina, but he and other jurists applied 
it in forms that supported enforcing rather than avoiding ḥudūd laws.
74) Ibn Rāhawayh (d. 238/853), Musnad, 2:567 (aqīlū dhawī ʾ l-hayaʾāt zallātihim, without 
the ḥudūd exception). On Ibn Rāhawayh’s jurisprudence, see Susan Spectorsky, “Ḥadīth 
in the Reponses of Isḥāq b. Rāhwayh,” Islamic Law and Society 8, 3 (2001), 407-31 (noting 
that, in his responses to speciﬁc questions (masāʾil), Ibn Rāhawayh relied more on scholarly 
opinion and Companion sayings and less on prophetic ḥadīths than a Schachtian view of 
traditionists and of Shāﬁʿī’s inﬂuence initially would lead one to surmise); cf. eadem, trans., 
Chapters on Marriage and Divorce: Responses of Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Rāhwayh (Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press, 1993), esp. 1-59 (introduction with a detailed biography of Ibn 
Rāhawayh); ʿAbd al-Ghafūr b. ʿAbd al-Ḥaqq al-Balūshī, al-Imām Isḥāq b. Rāhawayh 
wa-kitābuh al-Musnad (Medina: Maktabat al-Īmān, 1990) (expanded biography of Ibn 
Rāhawayh). 
75) As we saw above, Ibn Ḥanbal acknowledged the report that the Prophet avoided a ḥadd 
punishment in at least one instance, but he rejected the notion that his act had a more 
general application, as represented in one of the ḥadīth formulations of the maxim of which 
Ibn Ḥanbal was aware. As such, he seemed to have restricted the scope of the practice, or 
at least some of his later followers understood him to have regarded ḥadd avoidance in that 
case as a one-time exception rather than a prospective rule or general principle of ḥudūd 
laws.
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are many versions of the aqīlū saying.76 The relevant difference among 
them is the occasional inclusion or exclusion of a “ḥudūd exception,” 
which stipulates that any lenient stance toward the minor faults or mis-
demeanors of high status members of society is inapt when it comes to 
ḥudūd crimes. For such serious crimes and moral offenses, the ḥudūd 
exception emphasizes that those of high status are subject to punish-
ment like anyone else. 
Worth noting is that, while Ibn Rāhawayh does not mention the 
ḥudūd exception, Ibn Ḥanbal includes it, as do Ibn ʿAdī and Qāḍī 
Nuʿmān and most others who quote the ḥudūd maxim in addition to 
the aqīlū saying.77 As such, these versions with the ḥudūd exception 
tend toward ḥudūd enforcement rather than ḥudūd avoidance. While 
both the ḥudūd maxim and the aqīlū saying were known by his time,78 
Ibn Ḥanbal’s treatment suggests that the lack of overlap between them 
amongst the ḥadīth collections and juristic works was not fortuitous. 
76) ere are three other diﬀerences in terminology, as follows: (1) the term used for 
“overlook” is variously tajāwazū, aqīlū, ajīzū, or ihtabalū; (2) the term used to refer to those 
of high status is alternatively al-kirām, dhawū ʾl-hayaʾāt or hayʾa, dhū ʾl-murūʾa/dhawū 
ʾl-murūʾāt, dhawū ʾ l-sakhāʾ, and even dhawū ʾ l-buyūt (as in Muḥammad Amīn b. Faḍl Allāh 
al-Muḥibbī, Khulāṣat al-athar fī aʿyān al-qarn al-hādī ʿashar (Beirut: Maktabat Khayyāṭ, 
[1966]), 4:422—though this author or the teacher who related it to him ap parently copied 
or paraphrased the term incorrectly); (3) the terms used for “faults” or “misdemeanors” 
include ʿatha rātihim, zallātihim, dhilla. For a list of several versions, see al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, 
Kanz al-ʿummāl, nos. 12,975-84, 12,987-88. e second set of terms (kirām, dhawū 
ʾl-hayaʾāt, etc., loosely translating as “those of high station”) is perhaps most interesting, as 
it raises questions about just which class of people the maxim is designed to encompass. 
For an excellent discussion of class distinctions in Islamic history (through the 8th/14th 
century), see generally Louise Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic ought 
(Cambridge; NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
77) e version with the ḥudūd exception appears more widespread. Both versions, with 
and without the ḥudūd exception, appear in Nasāʾī and Ibn Rāhawayh. Abū Dāwūd, Ibn 
Ḥanbal, Bayhaqī, Dāraquṭnī, Ṭabarānī, and Ibn ʿ Adī only have the version with the ḥudūd 
exception. See above, note 61.
78) We have already seen that the aqīlū saying was scattered through the ḥadīth literature. 
It also appears regularly in compilations of sayings and proverbs of the time, notably, 
without the ḥudūd exception. See, e.g., Abū ʿ Ubayd al-Qāsim b. Sallām (d. 224/838), Kitāb 
al-Amthāl, ed. ʿ Abd al-Majīd Qaṭāmish (Mecca: Jāmiʿat al-Malik ʿ Abd al-ʿAzīz, 1980), 1:52, 
no. 68. See also Marlow’s discussion and the citations therein, indicating circulation of this 
same saying in the pre-Islamic period. Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism, 27-8, note 
78.
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As an opponent of gratuitous ḥudūd avoidance, he found the ḥudūd 
maxim spurious and the aqīlū saying wholly unacceptable without a 
ḥudūd exception. Though other scholars disagreed with him about the 
ḥudūd maxim, most came to signal agreement with his sentiment 
against the aqīlū saying. Accordingly, that saying virtually disappears 
from subsequent legal literature,79 while the ḥudūd maxim figures pro-
minently.
B. Legal-eoretical Rejection of Class-Based Distinctions
With this survey, we are now in a better position to revisit theories 
about the provenance and social context of the ḥudūd maxim. In the 
form of a ḥadīth, it was certainly of Kufan stock, though the standard 
form circulated in centers outside of Abū Ḥanīfa’s circle, such as Bagh-
dad, Egypt, and Medina. Questions of dating linked to the socio-legal 
import of the maxims are more complicated.
Enter the notion of a “touch of class.” Recall Fierro’s suggestion that 
the two versions of the ḥudūd maxim reflected a historical trend of 
favoring the social elite in criminal proceedings. To support her point, 
she provides many examples of how the maxim was indeed used and 
abused to favor the rich and powerful. The historical point outlining 
this social context is not to be denied. Yet it is questionable whether 
this trend can support her associated argument about dating. She argues 
that, of the two forms she has highlighted, the vague phrase “as much 
as you can” preceded the more specific phrase “doubts and ambiguities 
(shubahāt).” The latter replaced the former, she argues, in an attempt 
to curtail and obscure the maxim’s arbitrary elite-favoring aspects with 
objective standards that would avoid the censure of the “pious oppo-
sition.”80
79) An exception appears, perhaps predictably, in later Ḥanbalī literature, when Ibn Qayyim 
al-Jawziyya cites the aqīlū saying with its ḥudūd exception, as had Ibn Ḥanbal. See the 
collection of his ﬁqh opinions: Jāmiʿ al-ﬁqh, ed. Yusrī al-Sayyid Muḥammad (al-Manṣūra, 
Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ lil-Ṭibāʿa waʾl-Nashr waʾl-Tawzīʿ, 1428/2007), 6:414 (citing and 
commenting on a citation to the saying as a ḥadīth by the 5th/11th century Ḥanbalī luminary, 
Ibn ʿĀqil: aqīlū dhawī ʾl-hayaʾāt ʿatharātihim illā ʾl-ḥudūd).
80) Fierro is suggesting that shubahāt is more of a technical term and thus more limited 
than mā ʾstaṭaʿtum. She posits that the latter preceded the former, which emerged as a 
response to the “pious opposition,” such as Ibn Ḥanbal, Ibn Mājah, and Tirmidhī (and 
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The distinction made by Fierro is an important one, if not necessar-
ily to support her hypothesis. In noting the differences between the two 
forms of the maxim, and in calling attention to the legalistic tenor of 
the shubahāt version, her intervention may explain why the standard 
version becomes central in the later juristic literature. Indeed, both 
ḥadīth scholars and, as we will see, jurists graft a prophetic attribution 
onto the standard version in the later period, signaling a preference 
for the more legalistic phrase. But this is not to say that shubha was a 
well-defined technical term during this period (the sources suggest that 
it was not) or that the standard juristic version itself came later (the 
sources suggest that it did not).
The sources indicate that the differences in the form of the maxim 
in the early period were a matter not of sequence, but of genre. Our 
examination of the first three centuries of ḥadīth and legal literature 
revealed that the ḥadīth versions and the standard version of the ḥudūd 
maxim circulated in two completely different arenas, simultaneously. 
Ḥadīth scholars concerned with one set of criteria for recording tradi-
tions included in their collections a set of reports different from the 
maxim used by jurists interested in using another set of criteria for 
expounding law. Thus, ḥadīth scholars cited the various versions of the 
maxim but never mentioned the standard version, which did not meet 
their criteria for ḥadīth reliability; meanwhile, legal scholars consistently 
cited the standard version when articulating and applying the law. This 
practice clarifies an important feature of the early legal system. Both 
camps knew of both versions. The jurists, however, did not regard their 
formulation as prophetic in origin; still, they cited and applied the 
later Ibn Ḥazm), who were concerned that the law be applied in an egalitarian way. See 
Fierro, “When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt,” 227, 236 (noting traditions forbidding 
Muslims from interceding on behalf of one’s [high-status] peers). is view of the technical 
nature of the term shubahāt bears out in the later sources, and its more exacting potential 
may indeed explain why jurists picked up and standardized the shubahāt version over the 
other as, gradually, they elaborated the concept and contours of shubha. See below, notes 
83, 127. At the same time, arguably (at least for the likes of Ibn Ḥazm), the shubahāt 
version provides a framework no more or less arbitrary than any other version of the maxim 
during the period in question (the ﬁrst two to three centuries). More importantly, as I hope 
to have demonstrated here, both versions are contemporaneous to one another, but circulate 
in diﬀerent scholarly circles; and, as I argue elsewhere, the elaboration of shubha comes 
later: jurists who invoke it do not dress it with any marked precision until the 4th and 5th 
centuries AH.
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ḥudūd maxim as a substantive principle of criminal law that drew on 
earlier precedent. In other words, though the wording was not author-
itative, the precedent—as expressed in the maxim—was. In this way, 
the ḥudūd maxim reflected a settled legal principle even as early as the 
late 1st/7th or 2nd/8th century, when Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, Shāfiʿī, Mālik, 
Abū Yūsuf, and others cited it as axiomatic and repeated it in a standard 
form.
Having established that genre rather than sequence better describes 
the differences between basic versions of the ḥudūd maxim, what of the 
other versions that combine it with the aqīlū saying? The existence of 
this version in Ibn ʿAdī’s work, Fierro suggests, provides corroborating 
support for the historical trend of favoring the elite in criminal laws. 
Here is where timing does come into play. While the aqīlū saying was 
as old as the ḥudūd maxim, the combined version attributed to Ibn ʿ Adī 
and Qāḍī Nuʿmān was not. It came later through the combination of 
these two different sayings circulating in two different regions in the 
earliest period. Additionally, even if the two sayings were known in the 
same region at some point at least in the mid-3rd/9th century, as  indicated 
by Ibn Ḥanbal’s reference to both, was the prescriptive value of the 
aqīlū saying intended to avert ḥudūd punishments from those of high 
social status? Perhaps so without the ḥudūd exception, but emphatically 
not with it. We have seen that Ibn Ḥanbal’s version of the aqīlū saying 
co-opts a known saying that reflected societal norms of privileging the 
elite, but makes clear that their privilege does not exempt them from 
ḥudūd liability. It may be that he and his cohorts emphasized the ḥudūd 
exception precisely to curb elite privilege in applications of ḥudūd laws. 
In sum, whereas the “arbitrary” and “objective” versions of the ḥudūd 
maxim circulated side-by-side in the early period (through the 3rd/9th 
century), the widespread aqīlū saying was disregarded amongst jurists 
in the ḥudūd context at that time, and it certainly was not appended 
to the ḥudūd maxim as a single saying in the ḥadīth context. The aqīlū 
saying was attached to the ḥudūd maxim after the principle of manda-
tory ḥudūd enforcement across-the-board had won out; the addition 
carried a ḥudūd exception designed to underscore, not subvert, the 
principle that the elite were not exempt from criminal liability.
It is doubtful then that elite Ḥanafī jurists whose social peers stood 
to benefit from relaxed ḥudūd laws were responsible for circulating the 
standard (or combined) version of the ḥudūd maxim, at least not pri-
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marily in order to favor the upper classes. The stories about Zufar and 
Abū Yūsuf are unavailing. Remember that in his rebuke of Zufar, ʿAbd 
al-Wāḥid does not claim that Zufar attributed the maxim to the Pro-
phet. The story about Abū Yūsuf, which does adduce a prophetic attri-
bution, comes from a 4th century source—by which time the maxim 
had come to be regarded widely as a prophetic ḥadīth. Moreover, the 
several examples from early legal sources applying the maxim to the 
underprivileged and non-scholarly classes show that this principle was 
not one meant just for the elite.81 
All of this notwithstanding, it is doubtless true—at least in the liter-
ary memory of the Muslim historians—that some jurists used the 
maxim to benefit the elite, as the many examples Fierro adduces show. 
She well describes the social context that no doubt rankled jurists like 
Ibn Ḥanbal and Ibn Ḥazm, who wanted more principled applications 
of the law based on authentic traditions and who opposed the maxim 
on grounds of authenticity and coherence. But such preferential treat-
ments likely incensed ḥudūd maxim proponents—amongst the Ḥanafīs, 
Shāfiʿīs, Mālikīs, and Shīʿa—who accepted the authority of the maxim 
regardless of its status as a prophetic ḥadīth and also displayed sensi-
tivities to abuse of the maxim. They labored to curb social and political 
abuses too by defining the proper contours and scope of the maxim—
sometimes with the effect of critiquing the overuse of the maxim, but 
more often objecting to its underuse. 
It is important not to conflate the practice with the theory of the 
maxim in considering questions of provenance and juristic conceptions 
of the law. In practice, as Fierro shows, criminal law application was 
often at odds with theory. The theory was one of consistent ḥudūd 
avoidance following authoritative practices from the earliest period, as 
enshrined in the ḥudūd maxim. In society, hierarchy took hold in crim-
inal and other areas of law early on; but where jurists accommodated 
it generally, they resisted it in criminal law, and this led to exaggerated 
attempts to avoid criminal sanctions in the laws on the books through 
81) E.g., the cases cited above, notes 38-41 (indicating some instances where the maxim 
was used to favor the uneducated, non-elite new converts who lacked high social status). 
To be sure, it is not clear that Fierro is suggesting that the maxims were intended to beneﬁt 
the elite exclusively; rather, she emphasizes that the maxim likely emerged from and was 
easily abused by the elite in practice.
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a robust “jurisprudence of doubt.” Attempts to flatten class distinctions 
in prosecutions thus later appeared in the form of the modified aqīlū 
saying appended to the original ḥudūd maxim. As shown below, sub-
sequently, jurists insisted on the equal-treatment theory of ḥudūd avoid-
ance and championed the ḥudūd maxim as the central substantive canon 
of criminal law for all defendants regardless of status or political pull.
V. e Ḥudūd Maxim amongst Later Jurists 
A. Juristic Proponents
The ḥudūd maxim appears in the earliest Islamic legal texts, as jurists 
cite and apply it in considerations of criminal violations. From the 
4th/10th century onward, Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, and Imāmī Shīʿī jurists 
developed the doctrine of doubt and continued to apply the maxim 
widely, as both a precedential ḥadīth-text and a central maxim of Islamic 
criminal law.82 By the time of the rise of the collections of legal maxims 
82) e earliest juristic attribution of the maxim to the Prophet that I have been able to 
ﬁnd from a source veriﬁably ascribed to its writer is that of the Ḥanafī jurist Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 
370/981), Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, 3:330; around the same time, the Qayrawānī biographer 
Khushanī records an incident where the Cordoban Mālikī jurist ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Ḥabīb 
(d. 238/853) attributed the maxim to the Prophet as well. See Muḥammad b. al-Ḥārith 
al-Khushanī (d. 361/971 or 371/981), Akhbār al-fuqahāʾ waʾl-muḥaddithīn, ed. Sālim 
Muṣṭafā al-Badrī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1999), 190. e maxim appears 
elsewhere in sources that suggest even earlier juristic attributions to the Prophet, but the 
possibility of interpolation cannot be ruled out, and seems likely, as contemporaneous 
sources indicate that no other 2nd/8th or 3rd/9th-century ﬁgure deemed the maxim pro-
phetic—even though most later sources suggest that they did. For example, there is the 
citation to Ibn Ḥabīb—both a jurist and a traditionist—who reportedly used the maxim 
as a prophetic saying to save his brother Hārūn from an accusation of blasphemy. See 
Khushanī, Akhbār, 186-91. Another prominent Mālikī jurist of Cordoba, Muḥammad b. 
Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-ʿUtbī (d. 255/869), reported a case in which a man suﬀering 
from extreme hunger sold his wife to another man for funds; Mālik’s student ʿAbd 
al-Raḥmān b. al-Qāsim reportedly invoked the maxim as a ḥadīth to avoid the punishment. 
See Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (d. 520/1122), al-Bayān waʾl-taḥṣīl, ed. Muḥammad Ḥajjī (Beirut: 
Dār al-Gharb al-Islamī, 1984), 16:324 (quoting the ʿUtbiyya: qad jāʾa ʾl-ḥadīth idraʾū 
ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt). (I owe these references to Maribel Fierro.) 
 Khushanī’s “prophetic” attributions here should be read with caution, as they appear in 
a source from a period when the maxim has become entrenched as a prophetic ḥadīth 
(4th/10th century); it is not clear whether ʿ Utbī’s use of ḥadīth is to be taken in the developed 
technical sense of a prophetic statement; and we have indications that at least in one case, 
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in the 7th/13th through 10th/16th centuries, juristic writings well reflect 
the entrenchment of that maxim. A brief survey of these school’s posi-
tions in works of fiqh and legal maxims demonstrates the extent to 
which the ḥudūd maxim had become central to criminal law in both 
citation and application.83 
In the case of a man forced to rape a woman, the leading Ḥanafī of 
his time in Baghdad, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1037), 
defends the unique Ḥanafī position that judges need not avoid impos-
ing the ḥadd punishment for zinā on the perpetrator because of their 
view that his act could not have been involunt ary, as fear—they say—
prevents desire and arousal. Though Ḥanafīs do not believe there to be 
ambiguity in this case, Qudūrī notes that he would avoid the punish-
ment if there were any ambiguity by operation of the ḥudūd maxim 
announced by the Prophet.84 He and other Ḥanafīs uniformly apply 
the maxim in several cases of ambiguity when they do find it.85 By the 
the earlier jurists ʿUtbī cited in this work either did not know the maxim as prophetic or 
if they did, they did not append a prophetic attribution to it. at is, Saḥnūn (d. 240/854) 
relied on Ibn al-Qāsim in compiling the Mudawwana; he obtained a notebook recording 
Mālik’s sayings and legal opinions from his student Asad b. al-Furāt (d. 213/828) and 
veriﬁed those answers with Ibn al-Qāsim directly. ʿUtbī, a contemporary of Saḥnūn, 
similarly relied on Ibn al-Qāsim through copying the latter jurist’s notebooks (juzʾ, samāʿ) 
amongst those of other students of Mālik in his compilation of Mālikī opinions, al-ʿUtbiyya. 
See ʿ Umar b. ʿ Abd al-Karīm al-Jīdī, Mabāḥith fī ʾ l-madhhab al-Mālikī bi ʾ l-Maghrib (Rabat: 
al-Hilāl al-ʿAra biyya lil-Ṭibāʿa waʾl-Nashr, 1993), 70-72. We would expect that if Ibn 
al-Qāsim in fact quoted the maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth in one place, he would have done 
so when relating (or verifying) Mālik’s opinions to Saḥnūn and/or in his notebook from 
which ʿUtbī copied. But this seems not to have been the case. As recorded in the 
Mudawwana, Ibn al-Qāsim recounted the maxim to Saḥnūn twice, but on speciﬁcally 
anonymous authority both times (yuqāl and qad qīla). See above, note 43.
83) As a ḥadīth and a legal maxim, jurists constantly employed the maxim to resolve the 
“hard cases”—those that were not rendered clear-cut by existing texts, including early 
precedents. As they did so, they developed their own conceptions of what constituted the 
types of ambiguities that would evoke the maxim’s application, which were then culled out 
and applied in works of ﬁqh, fatwās, and—in short form—works of legal maxims.
84) Abū ʾl-Ḥusayn al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1037), Tajrīd, ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad al-Sirāj and 
ʿAlī Jumʿa Muḥammad (Cairo; Alexandria: Dār al-Salām, 2004), 11:5897 (attributing the 
standard formula to the Prophet: (idraʾū ʾ l-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt); see also Shams al-Aʾimma 
al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), Uṣūl, ed. Abū ʾ l-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, 1973), 
1:147 (attributing the maxim to the Prophet), 167, 290, 2:285.
85) E.g., Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), Mabsūṭ, ed. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥam mad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl 
al-Shāﬁʿī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya 2001), 9:61-6; Abū Bakr al-Kāsānī (d. 
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time of Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563), who authored the central work on 
Ḥanafī legal maxims, the matter had been settled amongst the jurists. 
He announces the ḥudūd maxim as an authentic prophetic ḥadīth as 
agreed-upon and accepted by the entire Muslim community, saying 
that “jurists of all regions have come to a consensus that [the maxim 
applies].”86
Similarly, in the Shāfiʿī context, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) 
adduces the legal maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth when he applies it to 
require avoiding the ḥadd punishment for zinā in a situation wherein 
two people had intimate relations in the context of a marriage of dis-
puted legal validity. Examples of these doubtful marriages include tem-
p orary marriage (permitted in the Sunnī Meccan school and by the 
Shīʿa), marriage without a guardian (permitted by Ḥanafīs), and mar-
riage without witnesses (permitted by Mālikīs). The basis for avoiding 
the ḥadd in such cases, Ghazālī explains, is the “[prophetic] ḥadīth: … 
avoid criminal punishments in cases of doubt;” and the juristic dispute 
suffices to create a ḥadd-averting doubt.87 Other Shāfiʿīs uniformly 
587/1191), Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ, ed. Aḥmad Mukhtār ʿ Uthmān ([Cairo]: Zaka riyyā ʿ Alī Yūsuf, 
1968), 9:4150-8; Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197), Hidāya, in Akmal al-Dīn 
Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Bābartī (d. 786/1384), al-ʿInāya fī sharḥ al-Hidāya (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2007), 4:148-52; ʿ Abd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310), 
Kanz al-daqāʾiq, ed. Abū ʾ l-Ḥusayn ʿ Abd al-Majīd al-Murādzahī al-Khāshī (Zāhidān, Iran: 
Muʾassasat Usāma, 2003), 1:563-4; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Zaylaʿī (d. 743/1343), Tabyīn 
al-ḥaqāʾiq, ed. Aḥmad ʿIzzū ʿInāya (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000), 3:566-8; Ibn 
al-Humām (d. 861/1457), Fatḥ al-qadīr (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, [1972?]), 5:249-52; Ibn 
Nujaym (d. 970/1563), al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq sharḥ Kanz al-daqāʾiq ([Cairo]: n.p., 1893?), 5:5-
15.
86) Ibn Nujaym, Ashbāh, 142 (citing the maxim—here: al-ḥudūd tudraʾ biʾl-shubahāt—as 
a ḥadīth in collections of Ibn ʿAdī, Ibn Mājah, Tirmidhī, and others). But some scholars 
notice that the ḥadīth was problematic and likely inauthentic. For example, the Sunnī 
ḥadīth scholar ʿ Abd Allāh b. Yūsuf Zaylaʿī (d. 762/1360-1) says that the ḥadīth in its popular 
form (idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt) is inauthentic or anomalous (gharīb), with many 
problematic links in the chains in the ḥadīth collections. Jamal al-Dīn al-Zaylaʿī, Naṣb 
al-rāya: takhrīj aḥādīth al-Hidāya, ed. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub 
al-ʿIlmiyya, 1996), 3:333. For a similar view in the Shīʿī context, see Jawād al-Tabrīzī, Ṣirāṭ 
al-najāt (Qum: Dār al-Ṣadīqa al-Shahīda, 1422/[2001-2]), 1:551.
87) Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Wasīṭ fī ʾl-madhhab, ed. Aḥmad Maḥmūd 
Ibrāhīm and Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir ([Cairo?]: Dār al-Salām, 1997), 6:443-4 
(quoting the standard formula: idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt); see also idem, Wajīz, 2:167; 
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apply the maxim in like cases involving various types of doubt or ambi-
guity.88 By the time of Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), who authored a core work 
on Shāfiʿī legal maxims, and even before,89 the matter had been settled 
as much for Shāfiʿīs as it had for Ḥanafīs. The Prophet, Suyūṭī ex-
plains, had commanded ḥudūd avoidance in instances of doubt or 
ambi guity.90
idem, al-Mustaṣfā, 1:382. Cf. Māwardī (d. 450/1058), al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, 254 (attrib-
uting it to the Prophet).
88) E.g., Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), al-Tabṣira fī uṣūl al-ﬁqh, ed. Muḥammad 
Ḥasan Haytū (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1980), 1:485 (indicating that the Prophet said both 
idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd ... biʾl-shubahāt and ... mā ʾstaṭaʿtum); Sayf al-Dīn Abū Bakr al-Qaﬀāl 
al-Shāshī (d. 507/1113), Ḥilyat al-ʿulamāʾ fī maʿrifat madhāhib al-fuqahāʾ, ed. Yāsīn Aḥmad 
Ibrāhīm Darādikah (Amman: Maktabat al-Risāla al-Ḥadītha; Mecca: Dār al-Bāz, 1988), 
8:7-15; Abū ʾl-Qāsim al-Rāﬁʿī (d. 623/1226), al-ʿAzīz sharḥ al-Wajīz, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad 
ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿ Alī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997), 
11:144-50 (citing the ḥudūd maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth, e.g., on p. 145); Muḥyī ʾl-Din 
al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), Minhāj al-ṭālibīn, ed. Aḥmad b. ʿ Abd al-ʿAzīz al-Ḥaddād (Beirut: 
Dār al-Bashāʾir, 2000), 3:206; idem, al-Majmūʿ sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, ed. Muḥammad 
Najīb al-Muṭīʿī ([Cairo]: Maktaba al-ʿAlamiyya biʾl-Fajjāla, 1971), 18:375, 385; idem, 
Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ 
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1992), 7:306-13; Muḥammad al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī 
(d. 972/1560), Mughnī al-muḥtāj ilā maʿrifat maʿānī alfāẓ al-Minhāj, ed. ʿ Ādil Aḥmad ʿ Abd 
al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 
5:442-5; Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 974/1567), Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj sharḥ al-Minhāj, ed. ʿ Abd 
Allāh Maḥmūd Muḥammad ʿUmar (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 4:118-21 
(citing the ḥudūd maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth, e.g., on p. 118, and as a khabar ṣaḥīḥ on 
pp. 119-20); Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Bājūrī (d. 1277/1860), al-Ḥāshiya ʿalā Sharḥ Ibn 
Qāsim al-Ghazzī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1974), 2:383-90.
89) He discusses the maxim and its various applications under the title al-qāʿida fī ʾl-shuba-
hāt al-dāriʾa lil-ḥudūd (“on the maxim regarding ḥudūd-averting doubts or ambiguities”), 
amongst other principles ranging from the general objectives of the law (maqāṣid) and rules 
of propriety (adab) to legal maxims proper. See al-ʿIzz b. ʿ Abd al-Salām, al-Qawāʿid al-kubrā, 
ed. Nazīh Kamāl Ḥammād and ʿUthmān Jumuʿa Ḍamīriyya, 2nd ed. (Damascus: Dār 
al-Qalam, 2007), 2:279-80. He is not, however, concerned with the origins of the maxim, 
and thus does not present it as a ḥadīth or discuss whether he deems it to be one. 
90) Suyūṭī, Ashbāh, 236-8 (citing the standard formula and listing various applications of 
the maxim). Suyūṭī’s discussion occurs in a chapter entitled al-ḥudūd tasquṭ [instead of 
tudraʾ] biʾl-shubahāt; for support, he cites the two canonical collections that include this 
maxim (Ibn Mājah, Tirmidhī), the fragment of the work attributed to Ibn ʿAdī, and other 
later collections.
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The Mālikīs are not much different. Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd (d. 595/ 
1198) explains that the Prophet commanded ḥudūd avoidance in all 
cases of doubt or ambiguity.91 Qarāfī adds that, in applying the maxim, 
he is following prophetic instructions as well as precedent recorded 
by Mālik’s student Ibn al-Qāsim (d. 191/806) in cases of ignorance. 
He also purports to be following Ibn Yūnus’s practice, which explicitly 
attributed the maxim to the Prophet.92 Other Mālikīs followed 
suit.93 By Qarāfī’s time (d. 684/1285), the maxim was firmly entrenched 
as a ḥadīth and legal principle and accordingly appears in his work of 
legal maxims, which is central to the Mālikī legal corpus.94 
91) Ibn Rushd al-Ḥafīd (d. 595/1198), Bidāyat al-mujtahid (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), 
2:297 (citing the standard formula); see also ibid., 2:324 (noting that all jurists agree—
based on the prophetic ḥadīth idraʾū ʾ l-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt—that an element for the crime 
of zinā is the absence of doubt, even if they disagree as to what constitutes doubts that are 
ḥadd-averting).
92) Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285), al-Dhakhīra fī furūʿ al-Mālikiyya, ed. Muḥam-
mad Bū Khubza (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1994), 12:50-1; cf. ibid., 12:60 (applying 
it as a ḥadīth and maxim to several cases).
93) Mālikīs regularly conceive of the maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth and apply it as such in 
deliberations both about legal issues and in actual cases. For deliberations in ﬁqh works, 
see, Shams al-Dīn al-Dasūqī (d. 1230/1815), Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī ʿalā ʾl-Sharḥ al-kabīr (by 
Dardīr), ed. Muḥammad ʿ Ulaysh ([Cairo]: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, [198-?]), 4:337 
(wa-qad wurida ʾdraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt ...); Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbd al-Samīʿ al-Ābdī al-Azharī, 
al-amar al-dānī fī taqrīb al-maʿānī sharḥ Risālat al-Qayrawānī (Cairo: Dār al-Faḍīla, 
2007), 617 (standard version, attributed to the Prophet). For instructions in a manual on 
judicial administration, see Ibn Farḥūn (d. 799/1396-7), Tabṣirat al-ḥukkām, ed. Jamāl 
Marʿashlī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2001), 2:88 (standard version, attributed to 
the Prophet). For legal opinions arising in actual judicial cases, see, e.g., Aḥmad al-Wansharīsī 
(d. 914/1508), al-Miʿyār al-muʿrib waʾl-jāmiʿ al-mughrib ʿan fatāwā ahl Ifrīqiya waʾl-Andalus 
waʾl-Maghrib, ed. M. Ḥajjī (Rabat: Wizārat al-Awqāf waʾl-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 1981), 
2:431 (quoting an opinion of a judge attributing the maxim to the Prophet); ibid., 4:493-5 
(same).
94) See Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285), Anwār al-burūq fī anwāʿ al-furūq (Beirut: 
Dār al-Maʿrifa, 197-), 4:1307, no. 240 (al-farq … bayn qāʿidat mā huwa shubha tudraʾ bihā 
ʾl-ḥudūd waʾl-kaﬀārāt wa-qāʿidat mā laysa kadhālik). Here he does not attribute the maxim 
to the Prophet. But he does make that attribution in his Dhakhīra, as noted above. Ibn 
al-Shaṭṭ, who comments on Qarāfī’s Dhakhīra, appears to be an exception to the dominant 
Mālikī trend of attributing the maxim to the Prophet; he explains that even though the 
maxim is not authentic (ṣaḥīḥ), it is nevertheless applicable because there is juristic consensus 
that imposing ḥudūd punishments can occur only where there is no doubt or ambiguity 
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Shīʿī jurists follow a similar pattern. Al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/947) 
notes that defective contracts give rise to ḥudūd avoidance if entered 
into in the presence of doubt or ambiguity.95 Ibn Idrīs (d. 598/1202) 
later spells out that the maxim applies simply because the Prophet com-
manded it. For example, if a soldier takes a portion of war spoils before 
they have been divided, he should not be punished for theft because, 
as  a soldier, his entitlement to some portion of the spoils creates ambi-
guity at the intersection between his ownership interest and the rule 
requiring him to wait for distribution of the spoils. At base, there can 
be no punishment then because of “the statement of the Prophet, uni-
versally agreed upon, ‘avoid ḥudūd punishments in cases of doubt or 
ambiguity.’”96 And the principle is applied elsewhere.97 Al-ʿAllāma 
al-Ḥillī notes several types of ḥadd-averting doubt in one of his treatises,98 
(shubha). Ibn al-Shaṭṭ (d. 723/1323), Idrār al-shurūq ʿ alā Anwāʿ al-furūq (ʿUmdat al-muḥaq-
qiqīn), on the margins of Qarāfī, Furūq, 4:316.
95) Mufīd, Muqniʿa (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1410/[1990]), 789 (al-ʿuqūd 
al-fāsida tudriʾ al-ḥadd … biʾl-shubahāt); see also 787 (citing a version of the maxim twice). 
He applies the rule to women (victims) accused of zinā in instances of alleged coercion, as 
in rape, see ibid., 787, 789, and instances where a defendant repents before a case is brought 
before the courts, ibid., 787.
96) Ibn Idrīs al-Ḥillī (d. 598/1201-2), Kitāb al-sarāʾir (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 
1410/[1989-90]), 3:485 (qawl al-rasūl ʿalayhi al-salām al-mujmaʿ ʿalayhi idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd 
biʾl-shubahāt, adduced to require canceling ḥadd liability for alleged cases of theft); cf. ibid. 
3:475 (on voiding ḥadd liability for alleged cases of drinking: fa-innahu qāla ʿ alayhi ʾ l-salām 
wa-rawathu ʾl-umma wa-ʾjtamaʿat ʿalayhi bi-ghayr khilāf: idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt); 
ibid., 3:446 (on removing ḥadd liability for alleged cases of zinā: al-khabar al-madhkūr 
al-mujmaʿ ʿalayh … [wa-] li-qawlih ʿalayhi ʾl-salām idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt).
97) See, e.g., Abū ʾ l-Ṣalāḥ al-Ḥalabī (d. 447/1055), Kāfī, 406 (recognized twice), 413 (same); 
Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067), al-Nihāya fī mujarrad al-ﬁqh waʾl-fatāwā ([Tehran]: 
Chāpkhāna-yi Dānishgāh, 1342/[1963]), 2:708, 711, 716 (three instances); 2:725, 746; 
Ibn Idrīs, Sarāʾir, in addition to citations above, see 3:428, 484 (two instances); 3:432, 446 
(two instances); 3:433-4, 445 (two instances), 450, 457 (three instances). 
98) Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325), Qawāʿid al-aḥkām (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr 
al-Islāmī al-Tābiʿa li-Jamāʿat al-Mudarrisīn bi-Qum, 1413-1419/[1992-1999]), 3:521-3. 
Despite its title, which in other contexts means “legal maxims,” this is not a treatise 
containing only legal maxims proper; its title more accurately relates a general sense of 
“principles of Islamic legal rulings,” including maxims. Accordingly, while it contains some 
maxims, most of the work is a concise listing of ﬁqh rulings, with brief explanations. For 
further detail, see idem, Irshād al-adhhān ilā aḥkām al-aymān, ed. Fāris al-Ḥassūn (Qum: 
Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmiyya, 1410/[1989-90]), esp. 2:170-92.
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and later jurists articulate the range of Shīʿī shubha as a part of the ḥudūd 
maxim’s central place in Shīʿī criminal law.99
B. Juristic Detractors (or Reluctant Adherents)
Ḥanbalī and Ẓāhirī jurists differ greatly from their Sunnī and Shīʿī 
counterparts by questioning or strongly opposing the ḥudūd maxim. 
Ḥanbalīs are ambivalent. They largely reject the maxim’s prophetic 
provenance and question the scope of its application, but many apply 
it nonetheless. Ẓāhirīs are adamant in their complete rejection of the 
maxim, its attribution, and application. 
From the beginning, we have noted that, as with the eponyms of the 
other schools, Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal never considered the standard form 
of the maxim to be a prophetic ḥadīth. To be sure, he mentions another 
version of the maxim as a prophetic ḥadīth in his Musnad, but deems 
it weak, as noted above. Yet, he signals that the application of the maxim 
was sound in cases of coercion and perhaps otherwise. These two fea-
tures—taken as a reflection of his traditionist jurisprudence—perhaps 
caused some dissonance in Ḥanbalī law, such that later Ḥanbalīs are of 
two minds on the matter.
Some apply the maxim, albeit typically without attributing it to 
the Prophet.100 For example, Ibn Ḥanbal’s student Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm 
99) Shīʿī qawāʿid works tend not to list types of shubha that require (or validate) ḥudūd-
avoidance separately from general discussions about shubha in uṣūl works or citations of 
the ḥudūd maxim in criminal law chapters in ﬁqh works. Compare al-Waḥīd al-Bihbahānī, 
al-Rasāʾil al-uṣūliyya (Qum: Muʾassasat al-ʿAllāma al-Mujaddid al-Waḥīd al-Bihbahānī, 
1416/[1996]), 403-4 (describing categories of shubha fī nafs al-ḥukm [i.e., shubha ḥukmiyya] 
and shubha fī ṭarīq al-ḥukm [i.e., shubha mawḍūʿiyya]), Muḥammad Riḍā al-Muẓaﬀar, Uṣūl 
al-ﬁqh, ed. al-Raḥmatī al-Arākī, 2nd ed. (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1423/
[2002?]), 4:314-15 (distinguishing shubahāt ḥukmiyya from mawḍūʿiyya), with, for example, 
Muḥammad al-Fāḍil al-Lankarānī, al-Qawāʿid al-ﬁqhiyya (Qum: Mihr, 1416/[1995]), 21 
(describing shubahāt ḥukmiyya). Muṣṭafā Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, an exception, outlines three 
categories: the ﬁrst two as labeled elsewhere—shubha ḥukmiyya (in which he includes 
ignorance of the law [jahl]) and shubha mawḍūʿiyya—plus a third category (which he culls 
from the detailed legal rules in ﬁqh manuals): shubha that arises from coercion and mistake 
(shubha-yi khaṭaʾ and shubha-yi ikrāh). See Muḥaqqiq Dāmād, Qavāʿid-i Fiqh (Tehran: 
Markaz-i Nashr-i ʿUlūm-i Islāmī, 1378), 4:54-61.
100) Exceptionally, the Ḥanbalī scholar is to be found who attributes the ḥudūd maxim to 
the Prophet. See, for example, works by two 5th/10th century scholars, Ibn al-Bannāʾ (d. 
471/1078-9), al-Muqniʿ fī sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Khiraqī, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Sulaymān b. 
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 disagreed with his teacher’s view that drinking intoxicating beverages 
warranted ḥadd punishment even when a person did not get drunk. 
Isḥāq did agree that the act of drinking was prohibited, based on a 
prophetic ḥadīth that “even small amounts of drinks that are intoxicat-
ing in abundance are prohibited (ḥarām).” But he was of the opinion 
that the ḥadd punishment did not apply because of the principle requir-
ing “the ḥadd sanction to be av oided in cases of doubt.”101
More tellingly, the erudite scholar Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223) in his 
Kāfī announces that one necessary element for finding a person guilty 
of committing theft is that there be no ambiguity as to ownership of 
the stolen item, because “ḥudūd sanctions are averted in cases of doubt.” 
Thus, the father is not punished for stealing his son’s or grandson’s 
property due to ambiguities that arise as to the status of his ownership 
over that property in light of the prophetic statement addressed to a 
young man, that “you and your property belong to your father.”102 
Compared to the other legal schools’ assiduous attribution of the maxim 
to the Prophet by Ibn Qudāma’s time and the provision here of a pro-
phetic ḥadīth to prove his point, Ibn Qudāma’s invocation of the maxim 
without a prophetic attribution is striking. He repeats this here and in 
other works, sometimes referring to the maxim as a “foundational prin-
ciple” of criminal law,103 and sometimes citing it to require avoidance 
of ḥudūd punishments in certain cases,104 but never—so far as I can 
tell—on the assumption or assertion that it is prophetic.
Ibrāhīm al-Baʿīmī (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 1993), 3:1120-1; Maḥfūẓ b. Aḥmad 
al-Kalwadhānī (d. 510/1116), al-Intiṣār fī ʾl-masāʾil al-kibār, ed. Sulaymān b. ʿAbd Allāh 
al-ʿUmayr (Riyadh: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1993), 1:313-19.
101) See Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm al-Naysābūrī (d. 275/888f ), Masāʾil al-Imām Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, 
ed. Abū ʾl-Ḥusayn Khālid b. Maḥmūd al-Ribāṭ et al. (Riyadh: Dār al-Hijra, 2004), 2:265.
102) Ibn Qudāma (d. 620/1223), al-Kāfī fī ﬁqh Ibn Ḥanbal, ed. Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh (Beirut: 
al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1979), 4:179. 
103 ) E.g., ibid., 4:550 (explaining that the second-hand testimony admissible in most 
commercial law matters is inadmissible in ḥudūd cases—li-anna mabnāh ʿalā ʾl-darʾ biʾl-
shubahāt).
104) See Ibn Qudāma, Mughnī, 9:116 (noting three other prophetic ḥadīths that create 
ambiguities as to whether a man has an ownership interest in his children’s property 
suﬃcient to avoid imposing the ḥudūd on him in cases of theft because of the ḥudūd maxim 
(i.e., that ḥudūd tudraʾ biʾl-shubahāt); and because the greatest shubha is where a man takes 
property in which the law gives him a property interest [māl jaʿalahu al-sharʿ lahu] then 
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Other Ḥanbalīs follow suit.105 The illustrious and sharp-tongued Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya, student of Ibn Taymiyya,106 advances pointed 
remarks in this vein. He acknowledges the maxim in the form that 
“punishments” (rather than the fixed punishments that form ḥudūd 
laws) “are to be avoided in cases of doubt or ambiguity,” perhaps using 
the non-technical term to underscore the non-prophetic nature of the 
saying or to indicate that it traverses ḥudūd-laws proper (to include 
discretionary punishments, taʿzīr, and retaliation, qiṣāṣ).107 He even 
applies it to require ḥudūd-avoidance in extreme situations, albeit on 
altogether different jurisprudential grounds. We have already seen one 
sort of alternative ground when Ibn Qudāma cited other prophetic 
ḥadīths as grounds for avoiding punishments. Ibn al-Qayyim follows 
this approach and adds to those textual bases reasons of repentance 
(tawba),108 necessity (ḍarūra),109 and the public interest (maṣlaḥa).110 In 
advises him to consume it freely). For his frequent citations to the maxim, see ibid., 12:243-
4, 275-77, 345-46, 347-48, 350, 354, 359, 363-64, 451, 501.
105) E.g., Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Zarkashī (d. 772/1370), Sharḥ al-Zarkashī ʿalā 
Mukhtaṣar al-Khiraqī, ed. ʿ Abd al-Munʿim Khalīl Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 
2002), 3:418 (citing the maxim, but not attributing it to the Prophet); Ibn Kathīr (d. 
774/1373), Tafsīr (n.p.: Dār al-Fikr, 1401), 2:57.
106) Ibn Taymiyya “silently” rejects the ḥudūd maxim. at is, he is aware of it—particularly 
given its prominence in Ibn Qudāma’s works—but he omits it in his ḥudūd opinions. See 
Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-Fatāwā, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Qāsim al-ʿĀṣimī 
al-Najdī (Beirut: Maṭābiʿ Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1997), 34:177ﬀ (section on ḥudūd laws, no 
mention of the maxim). Curiously though, he cites the maxim approvingly in his inter-
pretation of a Qurʾānic verse governing the authoritativeness of single-sources reports. His 
citation is somewhat oﬀ; it combines the standard version with one usually listed in 
collections of Tirmidhī and others (see Appendix, version 2), but he attributes it to the 
Sunan of Abū Dāwūd in a version that no traditionist or jurist knew. See ibid., 15:308 (... 
kamā fī Sunan Abī Dāwūd: idraʾū ʾ l-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt fa-inna ʾ l-imām in yukhṭiʾ fī ʾ l-ʿafw 
khayr min an yukhṭiʾ fī ʾl-ʿuqūba).
107) Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350), Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn, ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʾūf 
Saʿd (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1973), 1:104 (al-ʿuqūbāt tudraʾ biʾl-shubahāt). e maxim has been 
labeled the “ḥudūd” maxim here for the mention of ḥudūd in the standard formula and 
the centrality of that version in Islamic criminal law jurisprudence, but it is not limited 
strictly to ḥudūd contexts. Jurists often apply it to rules of qiṣāṣ (retaliation for murder, 
personal injury) and taʿzīr (discretionary punishments) as well. 
108) Ibid., 3:11.
109) Ibid., 3:13-5.
110) Ibid., 3:11.
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discussing cases of necessity, for example, he says that criminal liability 
does not attach to anyone who takes food during a time of famine or 
to anyone otherwise in need of food.111 Using the language of ambigu-
ity and doubt, he says that this (need for nourishment) creates a “strong 
doubt” as to culpability “that [requires] avoidance of the punishment 
from the one in need”—doubts certainly stronger than many of the 
so-called ambiguities adduced by several jurists.
Accordingly, Ibn al-Qayyim criticizes the Ḥanafīs and other jurists 
for applying the rule willy-nilly at the first sign of potential doubt, 
which no one in their right mind would have believed—absent the 
overuse of the maxim—was actually a ḥadd-averting ambiguity. Rhe-
torically, he asks how a jurist can consider the legal posture of a case to 
be ambiguous simply because it involves situations such as the follow-
ing: taking perishable items or items that were once in the commons 
and freely available (such as water), destruction rather than outright 
theft of an item kept in a secure location, repeat thefts, or the incoher-
ent Ḥanafī rule of avoiding the ḥadd punishment for a sex crime when 
a person has incestuous relations under the guise of a marriage contract 
(even though some Ḥanafīs would apply the ḥadd sanction to a man 
who mistakenly thinks that the woman with whom he had intimate 
relations was in fact his wife).112 Even if one accepts that the ḥudūd 
maxim is prophetic and warrants application on that basis, what leads 
jurists to presume that the existence of a per se invalid marriage contract, 
as between siblings, or a quasi-intentional homicide is the kind of ambi-
guity to which the maxim refers, to dispense with the ḥadd punishment 
111) Ibid., 3:15 (referring to such instances as maʿa ḍarūrat al-muḥtāj). 
112) Ibid., 1:314-5. In sharp contrast with the majority view, some Ḥanafīs hold that, if a 
man ﬁnds a woman sleeping in his house or bed and has intimate relations with her on the 
assumption that she is his wife, he is ḥadd-eligible if she turns out not to be. See, e.g., 
Qudūrī (d. 428/1037), Tajrīd, 11:5899; Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), 9:65 (quoting Hidāya). 
However, Abū Ḥanīfa and the handful of Ḥanafī jurists who follow him on this matter 
(the rest follow Abū Yūsuf and Shaybānī’s opinion to the contrary) developed a category 
of shubha that may be called contractual, which would exculpate the oﬀender in like cases. 
Under this category of shubha, whenever a legal act is performed on the basis of a contract, 
even if defective from the onset—such as marrying a sibling, even if knowingly—the 
existence of the contract creates the semblance of legality; that semblance is a ḥadd-averting 
shubha under this maxim. 
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for zinā or the retaliation requirement for homicide, respectively?113 In 
a play on words, Ibn al-Qayyim attacks his colleagues from other 
schools, saying that the jurists who find such cases to be confused or 
ambiguous (i.e., to have shubha) are the ones who have confused (ish-
tabaha) cases that incur ḥadd liability with ones that do not.114 
Given the questionable status of the maxim (as applied) in early 
Ḥanbalī works, by the time of the rise of concentrated scholarship on 
legal maxims, major Ḥanbalī jurists writing in the field do not mention 
it. Ibn Rajab, in his Qawāʿid, the principal Ḥanbalī text on legal max-
ims, omits the maxim completely.115 In certain cases, he avoids ḥudūd 
punishments, such as homicide of a Muslim against a non-Muslim, 
theft from a non-secure location or by stealth (as in fraud or embezzle-
ment), and theft of food during a time of famine. In these cases, liabil-
ity for the ḥudūd punishments is canceled because of a textual or other 
legal impediment, as Ibn al-Qayyim had explained in more detail; for 
Ibn Rajab, liability for the punishment is not completely removed, but 
the avoided ḥadd sanction is to be replaced with a heavy non-ḥadd 
punishment.116 Ibn al-Laḥḥām, in his work on legal maxims, does cite 
the ḥudūd maxim; for him, it is the expression of the uniform opinion 
“amongst all jurists” that there is no ḥadd- or qiṣāṣ-liability for minors 
“because [of the ḥudūd maxim]” and given that minority creates uncer-
tainty (shubha) as to moral or legal culpability.117 But he, like most 
113) Ibn al-Qayyim, Iʿlām, 1:241. 
114) Ibid., 3:15.
115) See Ibn Rajab (d. 795/1393), Qawāʿid (Mecca: Maktabat Nizār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 1999). 
Others writing on legal maxims at times simply are not concerned with ḥudūd laws. Ibn 
Taymiyya’s book, al-Qawāʿid al-ﬁqhiyya al-nūrāniyya, ed. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Khalīl 
(Dammām: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1422/[2001-2]), covers solely legal maxims concerned with 
commercial law.
116) See ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad al-Lāḥim, Sharḥ Tuḥfat ahl al-ṭalab fī tajrīd uṣūl 
Qawāʿid Ibn Rajab (Riyadh: Kunūz Ishbīliyyā lil-Nashr waʾl-Tawzīʿ, 2006), 435-7 (in the 
chapter called man suqiṭat ʿanh al-ʿuqūba bi-itlāf nafs aw ṭaraf maʿa qiyām al-muqtaḍī lah 
li-māniʿ fa-innahu yataḍaʿʿaf ʿ alayh al-ghurm, requiring, for instance, a Muslim to pay blood 
money equivalent to that of another Muslim for intentional homicide of a non-Muslim).
117) Ibn al-Laḥḥām (d. 803/1401-2), al-Qawāʿid waʾl-fawāʾid al-uṣūliyya, ed. Muḥammad 
Ḥāmid al-Fiqī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya, 1956), 1:29 (citing a version 
of the standard formula: al-ḥudūd tudraʾ biʾl-shubahāt).
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Ḥanbalīs, does not attribute the maxim to the Prophet;118 and the rea-
sons for avoiding the ḥadd sanction are really some legal impediment 
(here: missing element of the crime) rather than a genuine confusion 
of law or a mistake of fact as discussed by other jurists.
* * *
The Ẓāhirīs are unequivocal in their view: they reject the maxim 
 outright. Ibn Ḥazm lambastes those who deem it permissible to 
avoid ḥudūd sanctions and makes several arguments as to why.119 For 
one thing, the maxim has no legal basis in his eyes, because—contrary 
to the widespread notion amongst later jurists attributing the maxim 
to the Prophet—it is invalid, inauthentic, and definitely not pro-
phetic.120 Purported maxims-as-ḥadīths are, for him, merely statements 
118) I have noted a couple of exceptions, noticeably in the 5th/11th century, at which time 
the other schools have started regularly invoking and emphasizing the maxim as a prophetic 
ḥadīth: the two leading Ḥanbalī scholars Ibn al-Bannāʾ (d. 471/1078-9) and Maḥfūẓ b. 
Aḥmad al-Kalwadhānī (d. 510/1116) (though the same is not true just a generation before, 
judging by the works of their more famous, slightly older contemporary, Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā 
(d. 458/1066)). See above, note 100. For Abū Yaʿlā’s ḥudūd jurisprudence, see the collection 
of his opinions, al-Jāmiʿ al-ṣaghīr, ed. Nāṣir b. Saʿūd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Salāma (Riyadh: Dār 
Aṭlas), 307ﬀ. But see Abū Yaʿlā, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya, ed. Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī 
(Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1966), 263, 265-6 (mentioning shubha and ḥudūd 
avoidance, but not as a ḥadīth and only in the context of defending Ḥanbalī views on issues 
that are more polemical than authentically Ḥanbalī in what seems to be a refutation or 
“Ḥanbalization” of the Shāﬁʿī jurist Māwardī’s famous tract on political theory of the same 
name).
119) Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064), Muḥallā, 12:57-63 (masʾalat hal tudraʾ al-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt 
am lā), esp., 12:61-3, where he speciﬁcally criticizes the Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, and Shāﬁʿīs, in 
the order that he has ranked them according to their support for the maxim.
120) Ibid., 9:428; 8:252 (mā jāʾa ʿan al-Nabī qaṭṭu). To be sure, some non-Ẓāhirī jurists 
realized this as well (e.g., the Mālikī jurist Ibn Shaṭṭ, as described above note 94). But 
acknowledging that the maxim did not originate with the Prophet formally did not translate 
into invalidation of the principle. ose scholars, whose jurisprudence was more pragmatic 
and principle-based than formalistic and strictly text-based, saw substantive canons as 
precedents emanating from prophetic practice if not prophetic verbal directives. And for 
them, the attestations of the practice in early Islamic criminal law suﬃced to provide a 
basis for later Islamic criminal law. In other words, the non-prophetic provenance was 
problematic only for formalist-textualist schools of law that purported to build the law 
solely on explicit textual directives pronounced by God or the Prophet. Amongst the Sunnīs, 
this includes some Ḥanbalīs and Ẓāhirīs. Amongst the Shīʿa, Akhbārīs can be added in 
certain cases. (ough I know of no Akhbārī who has acknowledged that the maxim is not 
prophetic, Akhbārīs place wide-ranging restrictions on the scope of the maxim in line with 
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of  Com panions sometimes attributed to the Prophet, and thus non-
normative for law. 
For example, a look at the most-quoted form of the maxim, which 
appears in ʿAbd al-Razzāq’s collection on the authority of ʿUmar (as 
reported by Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī), reveals that it is patently inauthentic. 
Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī was born after ʿUmar died!121 Moreover, even the 
authentic ḥadīths on which ḥudūd maxim-proponents rely to shore up 
their positions contain no evidence that the presence of shubha drove 
the Prophet’s decisions. Thus, a ḥadīth about a member of the early 
Medinan community, Māʿiz, who confessed to committing zinā, but 
whom the Prophet turned away four separate times before finally ruling 
that the ḥadd sanction was due, is unrevealing about how to approach 
criminal law. Proponents of the ḥudūd maxim point to reports of Com-
panions’ discussions to the effect that the Prophet’s actions had to do 
with the presence of shubha, but Ibn Ḥazm rejects such post-hoc expla-
nation, calling it the mere speculation of the maxim-proponents, not 
the law. The law says that ḥudūd sanctions are mandatory when some-
one has confessed to a crime.122
Second, Ibn Ḥazm says, the maxim itself runs counter to the weight 
of all recognized Islamic legal authority. The Lawgiver announces cer-
tain legal prescriptions and proscriptions, notes that His laws (ḥudūd) 
are not to be transgressed, and imposes certain punishments when 
they are.123 Where the foundational sources stipulate certain ḥudūd 
punishments for specified crimes, applying the ḥudūd maxim would 
lead to neglecting the ḥudūd laws entirely, for anyone who could  proffer 
claims of ambiguity to void the punishment would do so by invoking 
certain theological-jurisprudential principles that also arise from their textualist-formalist 
orientation.)
121) See above, note 82.
122) Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, 8:252.
123) Ibid., 9:428 (citing a prophetic ḥadīth that life, honor, and other values are sacred, and 
Qurʾān, 2:229, to the eﬀect that God’s laws (ḥudūd) are not to be transgressed). is is an 
equation of ḥudūd as moral boundaries to ḥudūd in the sense of ﬁxed criminal laws, which 
was the ordinary sense in which most Muslim jurists came to regard the term—though 
contemporary scholars have pointed out that the ﬁrst sense is Qurʾānic while the second 
is not. See, e.g., Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Punishment in Islamic Law: A Critique of 
the Hudud Bill of Kelantan, Malaysia,” Arab Law Quarterly, 13, 3 (1998): 203-34.
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the maxim. Canceling ḥudūd liability so widely would cut against the 
consensus of Muslims, the Qurʾān, and the Sunna.124 
Finally, Ibn Ḥazm finishes, attempts to apply the maxim are incoher-
ent. Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs, whom he deems amongst the staunchest 
proponents of the maxim, are also amongst the harshest criminal law 
enforcers. Mālikīs would impose ḥudūd punishments for fornication 
on an unmarried woman with the circumstantial evidence of pregnancy 
even if she denied having committed a sex crime knowingly or volun-
tarily; this, despite the existence of all kinds of possible ambiguities, 
such as the possibility that she was raped, became pregnant during a 
valid marriage that was not publicized, or was temporarily insane.125 
Ḥanafīs would impose the punishment for theft against accomplices 
who merely accompany a thief into a house, without ascertaining 
whether the accomplice was a knowing and willing participant to the 
crime. If these do not constitute ambiguities and doubts as to the estab-
lishment of a crime that, even in the jurisprudence of doubt champi-
oned by ḥudūd maxim-proponents, should avert the ḥadd punishment, 
then the entire conception and application of the maxim is incoherent. 
With the maxim, proponents merely complicate matters, transgress the 
law, and apply rules disparately. In Ibn Ḥazm’s view, shubha has noth-
ing to do with enforcing criminal law. In fact “it is illegal [either] to 
avoid criminal sanctions in cases of shubha or to impose them in cases 
of shubha.” For him, the matter is simple: if the crime is established 
(and the accused found culpable), the ḥadd punishment is to be im -
posed; otherwise, when there is only shubha, punishment itself is imper-
missible.126
124) Ibn Ḥazm, Muḥallā, 9:428; see also a similar criticism in Ibn Ḥazm, Iḥkām, 7:454-5.
125) Ibid., 8:252.
126) Ibid., 12:57 (al-ḥudūd lā yaḥull an tudraʾ wa-lā an tuqām bi-shubha wa-innamā huwa 
ʾl-ḥaqq li-ʾllāh taʿālā wa-lā mazīd, fa-in lam yathbut al-ḥadd lam yaḥull an yuqām bi-shubha 
…). Strikingly, even though Ibn Ḥazm rejects the basis and formulation of the ḥudūd 
maxim, this statement virtually aligns his jurisprudence—albeit through other means—with 
that of ḥudūd maxim-proponents. 
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VI. Conclusion 
During the first three centuries after Islam’s advent, ḥadīth scholars and 
jurists circulated versions of the ḥudūd maxim in two different spheres. 
Whereas the former group used one type of formulation (“as much as 
you can,” some mention of ambiguity, and usually a rationale) the jurists 
used another (the standard version, idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt). So 
far as we can tell from the sources, both types were in circulation simul-
taneously at least by the mid-2nd/8th century and probably earlier (within 
the 1st/7th century). Amongst the jurists, even at that time, the standard 
version was a substantive canon of settled law that reflected earlier 
precedents.
The ḥudūd maxim was not a prophetic ḥadīth. A common link anal-
ysis of the ḥadīth-as-maxim would trace its prophetic attribution (or 
origin) to Zuhrī (d. 124/742) and Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d. ca. 96/717). 
Yet Schacht concluded that the maxim emerged  at the time of Ibrāhīm 
al-Nakhaʿī’s student Ḥammād, in part because he believed Ibrāhīm to 
be mythical, and in part because he did not have access to the sources 
showing Zuhrī as a common link. Fierro concluded that the “as much 
as you can” ḥadīth form of the maxim was in fact circulating at the time 
of Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī. The popularized juristic version must have been 
a later modification of the ḥadīth-versions, she reasons, because there 
was a need to coat that too-broad version with a legalistic patina by 
using shubahāt as a technical legal term in place of the unwieldy “as 
much as possible” formulation; it could then be used more legitimately 
by jurists who tended to privilege (and benefit from) social status in 
their judgments. Her analysis is a surprising reversal of a Schachtian 
conclusion (had he distinguished between the two types as she did), 
which views anonymous sayings like the juristic form of the maxim as 
older than the isnād-clad ḥadīth forms. Ultimately, however, these views 
are not supported by the sources, which reveal the simultaneity of the 
two versions and a late adoption of a combined version highlighting 
issues of social class.
Politics and social status played a role in applications of the maxim 
and other areas of law. In fact, the jurists’ increasing insistence on forms 
of the maxim and sayings that countered hierarchy and emphasized 
mandatoriness of ḥudūd enforcement underscores the extent to which 
jurists militated against preferential treatment in ḥudūd laws. Too, 
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 poli tical authorities exercised extremely wide discretion over criminal 
matters ostensibly within their enforcement jurisdiction (including 
ḥudūd sanctions, laws of retaliation, and discretionary punishments), 
to which jurists readily extended the ḥudūd maxim. For these reasons, 
jurists both in favor of and against the maxim attempted to define 
legally cognizable ḥadd-averting doubts and ambiguities or to find other 
means of curtailing arbitrary enforcement of ḥudūd laws. While some 
dispensed with the maxim altogether, most tried to refine and strengthen 
it for these purposes.
As the law developed, the maxim took on a standardized form in 
most juristic works from the 4th/10th century onward. The ḥudūd maxim 
(idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt) became a prophetic ḥadīth for Ḥanafī, 
Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Shīʿī jurists, whose “founders” had cited and em -
ployed the maxims themselves (though not with prophetic attributions). 
The matter grows to be so certain (or necessary) to them that the maxim 
becomes both a central legal maxim of Islamic criminal law and a pro-
phetic ḥadīth to bolster the authenticity and reach of such a seemingly 
law-flouting maxim used to avoid ḥudūd punishments. As a result, the 
maxim appears not only in these schools’ books of law but also in 
compendia of legal maxims that attempt to extract the essential prin-
ciples of the law, often right alongside some five “universal maxims.” 
The ḥudūd maxim is so securely entrenched that it seems a necessary 
feature of law, and must therefore be prophetic. It has become super-
precedent. This was the ready answer of most later juristic proponents 
of the ḥudūd maxim to the initial question posed: How does a judge 
really know when to punish the accused and what to do in cases of 
doubt given the appearance or accusation of criminal misconduct? Only 
the traditionist-textualist jurists—the Ẓāhirīs and some Ḥanbalīs—were 
consistently attuned to the non-prophetic pedigree of the maxim. This 
realization caused many of them to reject the maxim as both ḥadīth (in 
attribution) and substantive canon (in application). Their answer to 
questions of doubt was otherwise.127
127) Over time, most jurists elaborated complex and school-speciﬁc deﬁnitions of doubt 
and ambiguity (shubha) and applied the doctrine of ḥudūd avoidance in very diﬀerent ways 
when beset with doubt. As part of a study of legal maxims in Islamic law, my PhD dis-
sertation expands on questions of the deﬁnition and role of doubt (shubha) amongst the 
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Appendix
 
Ḥadīth Versions of the Ḥudūd Maxim
(with isnāds/chains of transmission)
Version 1
“Avoid ḥudūd punishments wherever you find an opportunity to do so.” (Idfaʿū 
ʾl-ḥudūd mā wajadtum lah madfaʿan.)  
Ibn Mājah (d. 303/915)128 ʿAbd Allā h b. al-Jarrāḥ—Wakīʿ—Ibrāhīm b. [al-] 
Faḍl—Saʿīd b. Abī Saʿīd—Abū Hurayra—Muḥam-
mad
Version 2
“Avoid ḥudūd punishments involving Muslims to the extent possible; if there is 
an exculpating cause for [the accused], then release him, as it is better that the 
imām make a mistake in pardoning than in punishing.” (Idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd ʿan 
al-muslimīn mā ʾstaṭaʿtum fa-in kāna lah makhrajan fa-khallū sabīlah fa-inna 
ʾl-imām in yukhṭiʾ fī ʾl-ʿafw khayr min an yukhṭiʾ fī ʾl-ʿuqūba.) 
ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/826)129  (1) Thawrī—Ḥammād—Ibrāhīm [al-Nakhaʿī]—
[anonymous]
various schools of Islamic law in theory and in practice, including juristic views on applying 
the ḥudūd maxim as well as those opposing it in favor of other strategies.
128) Ibn Mājah, Sunan, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Maḥmūd Ḥasan Naṣṣār (Beirut: Dār 
al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998), 4:161, no. 2545 (bāb satr ʿalā ʾl-muʾmin wa-dafʿ al-ḥudūd 
biʾl-shubahāt); Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf et al., eds., al-Musnad al-jāmiʿ (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl; 
Kuwait: Sharikat al-Muttaḥida, 1993-1996), 17:344, no. 13,743. For an English transla-
tion, see Muhammad b. Yazeed et al., ed. and trans., English Translation of Sunan Ibn Mājah 
(Riyadh: Dār al-Salām, 2007). Ḥadīth critics concluded that this report was extremely 
weak, as Ibrāhīm b. Faḍl’s narrations were rejected. See, with accompanying footnotes, Abū 
Yaʿlā, Musnad, 11:494, no. 6618; Mizzī, Tuḥfat al-ashrāf bi-maʿrifat al-aṭrāf (Beirut: Dār 
al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1999), 9:468, no. 12,945; Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, Ḍaʿīf 
Ibn Mājah, ed. Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1988), 554; idem, Irwāʾ 
al-ghalīl fī takhrīj aḥādīth Manār al-sabīl (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1979), 2:356.
129) ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Muṣannaf (1972), 10:166, no. 18,698 (variations in Arabic text: fa-idhā 
wajadtum lil-Muslim instead of fa-in kāna lah, fa-ʾdraʾ ʿanh instead of fa-khallū sabīlah; 
fa-innah in yukhṭiʾ ḥākim min ḥukkām al-muslimīn instead of fa-inna ʾl-imām).
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Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)130 (2) Wakīʿ [b. al-Jarrāḥ]—Yazīd b. Ziyād al-Baṣrī—
Zuhrī—ʿUrwa—ʿĀʾisha
Tirmidhī (d. 279/892)131 (3) Abū ʿAmr ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Aswad 
al-Baṣrī—Muḥammad [b.] Rabīʿa—Yazīd b. Ziyād 
al-Dimashqī—Zuhrī—ʿUrwa—ʿĀʾ i sha—
Muḥammad
 (4) Hannād—Wakīʿ—Yazīd b. Ziyād [al-Kūfī?] 
—...—[ʿĀʾisha]
Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995)132  (5) ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz—
Dāwūd b. Rashīd—Muḥammad b. Rabīʿa—Yazīd 
b. Ziyād al-Shāmī—Zuhrī—ʿUrwa—ʿĀʾisha—
Muḥammad
 (6) Ibrāhīm b. Ḥammād—al-Ḥasan b. ʿArafa—
Muḥammad b. Rabīʿa—Yazīd b. Ziyād al-Shāmī—
Zuhrī—ʿUrwa—ʿĀʾisha—Muḥammad
130) Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf, ed. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm al-Laḥīdān and Ḥamad b. ʿ Abd 
Allāh al-Jumʿa (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rushd, 2004), 9:360, no. 28,972 (variations in Arabic 
text: ʿibād Allāh instead of muslimīn).
131) Tirmidhī, Sunan (n.p.: 1965-1969), 5:112-3, no. 1424; al-Musnad al-jāmiʿ, 2:41-2, 
no. 16,799. Tirmidhī points out that the ﬁrst chain is likely inauthentic because it alone 
attributes the saying to the Prophet and does so through Yazīd b. Ziyād from Damascus, 
who was unreliable (ḍaʿīf al-ḥadīth). He deems the second chain (which he suggests goes 
back only to ʿĀʾisha) to be more sound (aṣaḥḥ); it was transmitted by the reliable Wakīʿ b. 
Jarrāḥ, likely by way of Yazīd b. Ziyād the Kufan, who is preferred and more reliable (aqdam 
wa-athbat) than the Damascene Yazīd. A Companion-attribution is to be expected, as this 
was a known saying amongst them. Tirmidhī, Sunan, 5:112 (noting attributions also to 
Abū Hurayra [as in Ibn Mājah] and ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAmr [b. al-ʿĀṣ], without complete 
chains). Note that Muḥammad Rabīʿa in this edition should be Muḥammad b. Rabīʿa, the 
Kufan paternal cousin of Wakīʿ (see Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-kamāl, 25:196-9, no. 5210), as in 
al-Musnad al-jāmiʿ, 2:41-2, no. 16,799. 
132) ʿAlī b. ʿUmar al-Dāraquṭnī, Sunan (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2004), 4:62-3, no. 
3097 (variations in Arabic text: transposition of mā ʾstaṭaʿtum and ʿan al-muslimīn; fa-in 
wajadtum lil-muslim makhrajan instead of fa-in kāna lah makhrajan). Note that this edition 
clariﬁes that what the 1966 edition presents as a single chain at 3:84 is in fact two chains. 
Like Tirmidhī, Dāraquṭnī has a problem with Yazīd b. Ziyād al-Dimashqī, whom he deems 
weak, based on Bukhārī’s assessment that this Yazīd’s ḥadīths are to be rejected (i.e., that 
he is munkar al-ḥadīth) and Nasāʾī’s similar conclusion (i.e., that he is matrūk [al-ḥadīth]). 
Dāraquṭnī adds that Wakīʿ related the saying on the authority of Yazīd in a chain that did 
not trace back to the Prophet (mawqūf) and agreed with Tirmidhī that this chain was more 
reliable.
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Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066)133  (7) Abū ʾ l-Ḥasan ʿ Alī Shaqīr b. Yaʿqūb—Abū Jaʿfar 
Aḥmad b. ʿĪsā b. Hārūn al-ʿIjlī—Muḥammad b. 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Abī Razma—al-Faḍl b. Mūsā and 
[his father] Mūsā—Yazīd b. Ziyād—Zuhrī—ʿUrwa 
—ʿĀʾisha—Muḥammad
 (8) Wakīʿ—Yazīd b. Ziyād—[Zuhrī]—[ʿUrwa]—
ʿĀʾisha 
 (9) Rishdīn b. Saʿd—ʿUqayl—Zuhrī—...—[Mu-
ḥammad: marfūʿ[an]]
 (10) Abū Ḥāzim al-Ḥāfiẓ—Abū ʾ l-Faḍl Khamīrwayh 
—Aḥmad b. Najda—Saʿīd b. Manṣūr—Hushaym 
—ʿUbayda—Ibrāhīm [al-Nakhaʿī]—[ʿAbd Allāh] 
Ibn Masʿūd 
Version 3
“Avoid ḥudūd (punishments) involving believers to the extent possible.” (Idraʾū 
ʾl-ḥudūd ʿan ʿibād Allāh mā ʾstaṭaʿtum.)
Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)134 Ibn Fuḍayl—al-Aʿmash—Ibrāhīm [al-Nakhaʿī]— 
[anonymous: kānū yaqūlūn]
133) Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:413, nos. 17,057-58 (variations in Arabic text for ﬁrst version (chain 
#s 7-9): same as Dāraquṭnī’s version above, with the addition of lah after fa-inna ʾl-imām 
in yukhṭiʾ fī ʾl-ʿafw khayr). Like Tirmidhī and Dāraquṭnī, Bayhaqī found the chain ending 
in ʿĀʾisha (chain #8), to be inauthentic because of Yazīd b. Ziyād’s unreliability (fīh ḍaʿf). 
He also found weak the chain reported by Rishdīn (chain #9), which is also traced back 
to the Prophet, because of Rishdīn’s unreliability (i.e., that he is ḍaʿīf). e more sound 
chain (aqrab ilā ʾl-ṣawāb) then is that of Wakīʿ (chain #4), as Tirmidhī and Dāraquṭnī 
concluded. Ibid. Note that Tirmidhī reports that this chain contains and stops with Yazīd 
b. Ziyād [al-Kūfī]. Bayhaqī traces that chain back to ʿ Āʾisha via Yazīd b. Ziyād [al-Shāmī?]—
Zuhrī—ʿUrwa. ere is some confusion as to whether the Yazīd b. Ziyād in this chain is 
Kufan or Damascene (Shāmī), as noted more extensively above, note 19. Bayhaqī’s editor 
says that he is Damascene; but Tirmidhī was aware of the diﬀerence and said that he was 
Kufan. Fierro has suggested that this was a deliberate substitution, a matter which requires 
further study. Finally, see also Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:414, no. 17,062 (variations in Arabic text 
from the second version [chain #10]: ʿan al-muslimīn omitted; innakum and appropriate 
verbs instead of imām, darʾ al-ḥadd repeated twice, and the ﬁrst and second parts of the 
maxim transposed). is version of the report is not attributed to the Prophet, but to 
the Companion and Kufan jurist Ibn Masʿūd (mawqūf  [an]); Bayhaqī has no comment, 
apparently accepting the attribution of the saying to Ibn Masʿūd through Ibrāhīm 
al-Nakhaʿī.
134) Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf, 9:359, no. 28,966. is version is similar to the one 
recorded in Ibn Mājah (version 1), using diﬀerent phrasing (idraʾū instead of idfaʿū and 
idhā ʾ staṭaʿtum instead of mā wajadtum lah makhrajan), and similar to the version recorded 
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Version 4
“If ḥadd [liability] is doubtful [to you], then avoid [the punishment].” (Idhā 
ʾshtabaha [ʿalayk] al-ḥadd fa-ʾdraʾah.) 
Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)135 (1) ʿAbd al-Salām [b. Ḥarb]—Isḥāq b. Farwa [sic = 
Isḥāq b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Farwa]—ʿAmr b. 
Shuʿayb —his father [= Shuʿayb b. Muḥammad]—
Muʿādh [b. Jabal], [ʿAbd Allāh] Ibn Masʿūd, and 
ʿUqba b. ʿĀmir
Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995)136  (2) Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Ghaylān—Abū 
Hishām al-Rafāʿī—ʿAbd al-Salām b. Ḥarb—Isḥāq 
b. ʿ Abd Allāh b. Abī Farwa—ʿAmr b. Shuʿayb—his 
father [= Shuʿayb b. Muḥammad]—Muʿādh b. 
Jabal, ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd, and ʿUqba b. ʿĀmir 
al-Jahnī
Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066)137  (3) Abu Ḥāzim al-Ḥāfiẓ—Abū ʾ l-Walīd al-Faqīh—
al-Ḥasan b. Sufyān—Abū Bakr b. Abī Shayba—
ʿAbd al-Salām b. Ḥarb—Isḥāq b. Abī Farwa [sic = 
Isḥāq b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī Farwa]—ʿAmr b. 
Shuʿayb—his father [= Shuʿayb b. Muḥammad]—
Muʿādh [b. Jabal], ʿAbd Allāh b. Masʿūd, and 
ʿUqba b. ʿĀmir
Version 5
“Avoid [sentences of ] death and flogging involving Muslims to the extent possi-
ble.” (Idraʾū ʾl-qatl waʾl-jald ʿan al-muslimīn mā ʾstaṭaʿtum.)
Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)138 (1) Wakīʿ—Sufyān—ʿĀṣim—Abū Wāʾil—ʿAbd 
Allāh [b. Masʿūd]
in the Muṣannaf of ʿAbd al-Razzāg and by Tirmidhī (version 2), except that it excludes the 
second part of that ḥadīth. Ibn Abī Shayba does not comment on the authenticity of the 
chain, as it is an anonymous saying adopted by Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī.
135) Ibid., 9:359, no. 28,964. He does not comment on the authenticity of the chain.
136) Dāraquṭnī records the same text (with the addition of mā ʾstaṭaʿt) and the same chain, 
as far back as ʿAbd al-Salām b. Ḥarb, who then transmits the statement to Abū Hishām 
al-Rifāʿī (rather than to Ibn Abī Shayba, as in Bayhaqī’s version below). Dāraquṭnī, Sunan, 
4:63-4, no. 3099 (reporting that this chain is weak because of the presence of Isḥāq b. 
Farwa, whose ḥadīths are to be rejected (matrūk qawluh)).
137) Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:414, no. 17,063 (Arabic text: idhā ʾshtabaha ʾl-ḥadd fa-ʾdraʾūh). He 
does not trace this back to the Prophet and has no comment.
138) Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf, 9:360, no. 28,968. He records this chain, which ends in a 
Companion, without commenting on its authenticity. 
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Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066)139 (2) Abū ʿ Abd Allāh al-Ḥāfiẓ—Abū ʾ l-Walīd al-Faqīh 
—Muḥammad b. Zahīr [or Zuhayr]—ʿAbd Allāh 
b. Hāshim—Wakīʿ—Sufyān—ʿĀṣim [b. Bahdala] 
—Abū Wāʾil—ʿAbd Allāh [b. Masʿūd]
Version 6
“Avoid ḥudūd [punishments] wherever there is doubt.” (Idfaʿū ʾl-ḥudūd li-kull 
shubha.) 
Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)140 ʿAbd al-Aʿlā—Burd—Zuhrī
Version 7
“That I suspend ḥudūd [punishments] where there is doubt is more preferable to 
me than imposing them where there is doubt.” (La-an uʿaṭṭil al-ḥudūd biʾl-
shubahāt aḥabb ilayya min [an] uqīmahā fī ʾl-shubahāt.)
Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849)141 (1) Hushaym—Manṣūr—al-Ḥārith—Ibrāhīm 
[al-Nakhaʿī]—[...]—ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb
Bayhaqī (d. 485/1066)142  (2) Abū Ṭāhir al-Faqīh—Abū Bakr al-Qaṭṭān—
Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥārith—Yaḥyā b. Abī Bukayr—
al-Ḥasan b. Ṣāliḥ—his father [= Ṣāliḥ b. Ṣāliḥ b. 
Ḥayy] —[...]—ʿUmar
Version 8
“If ‘perhaps’ and ‘maybe’ apply to [determining liability for] the ḥadd crime, there 
is no ḥadd liability.” (Idhā balagha fī ʾ l-ḥudūd laʿalla wa-ʿasā fa-ʾl-ḥadd-muʿaṭṭal.) 
ʿAbd al-Razzāq (d. 211/826)143 Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad—an associate (ṣāḥib lah)—
al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Muzāḥim—ʿAlī
139) Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:414, no. 17,064 (transposing jald and qatl). 
140) Ibn Abī Shayba, Muṣannaf, 9:360, no. 28,967 (or bi-kull shubha, according to the 
editor’s footnote). He does not comment on the authenticity of the report, which is attrib-
uted to Zuhrī.
141) Ibid., 9:359, no. 28,963. 
142) Bayhaqī has a similar version, also attributed to ʿUmar, but with slightly diﬀerent 
language. See Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:414, no. 17,061 (Arabic text: idhā ḥaḍartumūnā fa-ʾsʾalū 
fī ʾ l-ʿahd jahdakum fa-innī in ukhṭiʾ fī ʾ l-ʿafw aḥabb ilayya min an ukhṭiʾ fī ʾ l-ʿuqūba). Bayhaqī 
has no critical comments, though Ṣāliḥ does not transmit directly from ʿUmar. ere is 
likely a link missing in the chain to ʿUmar, as he was an adult before his son al-Ḥasan (d. 
169/785-6) was born in the year 100. See Mizzī, Tahdhīb al-kamāl, 13:54-6 (Ṣāliḥ); ibid., 
6:177-91 (al-Ḥasan). 
143) ʿAbd al-Razzāq, Muṣannaf (1972), 7:340-1.
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Version 9
“Avoid ḥudūd [punishments].” (Idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd.)
Dāraquṭnī (d. 385/995)144 (1) Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Zakariyyā—Abū 
Kurayb—Muʿāwiya b. Hishām—Mukhtār al-Tam-
mār—Abū Maṭar—ʿAlī—Muḥammad
Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066)145  (2) Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥārith al-Iṣbahānī—ʿAlī b. 
ʿUmar —Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Zakariyyā—
Abū Kurayb—Muʿāwiya b. Hishām—Mukhtār 
al-Tam mār—Abū Maṭar—ʿAlī—[Muḥammad: 
marfūʿ[an]]
Version 10
“Avoid ḥudūd [punishments], though it is improper for the imām to neglect them 
[completely].” (Idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd wa-lā yanbaghī lil-imām an yuʿaṭṭil al-ḥudūd.)
Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066)146  Abū Bakr b. al-Ḥārith—Muḥammad b. Ḥayyān—
Ibn Abī ʿĀṣim—al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī—Sahl b. 
144) Dāraquṭnī, Sunan, 4:63, no. 3098. He notes that the report is not sound because 
Mukhtār al-Tammār is unreliable. Although this version seems to be a truncated form of 
previous ones, I have counted it separately because its chain, uniquely among Sunnī 
collections, attributes it to the Prophet via ʿAlī; this formulation is also the beginning of 
other versions in Shīʿī collections that attribute the standard version of the saying to ʿAlī.
145) Bayhaqī, Sunan, 8:414, no. 17,059. e content and the chain are the same as the 
record above, except that the report comes to Bayhaqī through Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim 
to ʿAlī b. ʿUmar rather than Dāraquṭnī. Bayhaqī rejects this as well, saying that the chain 
is not sound. 
146) Ibid., no. 17,060. Bayhaqī too considers this report unreliable, because Bukhārī 
determined that Mukhtār b. Nāﬁʿ’s narrations are to be rejected (munkar al-ḥadīth). Cf. 
Shawkānī (d. 1839), Nayl al-awṭār, eds. Muḥammad Ḥallāq and ʿIzz al-Dīn Khaṭṭāb 
(Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1999), 7:109, who rejects ḥadīths such as this one 
with Mukhtār b. Nāﬁʿ in the chain for the same reason. (Shawkānī gives the standard 
version, but he must mean version 10, where this Mukhtār appears.) e word I have 
trans lated as “neglect completely” (yuʿaṭṭil) also means to void, cancel out, discontinue, or 
(per manently) suspend. is version is interesting because it combines ḥudūd-avoidance as 
in version 9 (or all other versions in truncated form) with a principle that seems to conﬂict 
with the rationale oﬀered in versions 2 and 7. In those versions, the exponents of the maxim 
(variously Companions Ibn Masʿūd, ʿĀʾisha, and ʿUmar plus the traditionist Zuhrī and 
jurist Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī) err on the side of caution, warning that it is better to pardon 
oﬀenders mistakenly than to punish non-oﬀenders falsely. Versions 7 and 10 (which oﬀers 
no rationale) uses language that parallels language here (taʿṭīl al-ḥudūd, muʿaṭṭal); I have 
translated it diﬀerently there (“suspend”) to reﬂect its implicit reference to case-by-case 
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Ḥammād—al-Mukhtār b. Nāfiʿ—Abū Ḥayyān 
al-Taymī—his father [Saʿīd b. Ḥayyān]—ʿAlī—
Muḥammad
Version 11
“Avoid ḥudūd [punishments] where there is doubt, and overlook the faults of 
the nobles except as regard to ḥudūd [crimes].” (Idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-shubahāt 
wa-aqīlū ʾl-kirām ʿatharātihim illā fī ḥudūd Allāh.) 
Qāḍī Nuʿmān (d. 363/974)147 (1) [no isnād]
Ibn ʿAdī (d. 365/976)148  (2) Ibn Lahīʿa—Yazīd b. Abī Ḥabīb—ʿIkrima—Ibn 
ʿAbbās
individual determinations of ḥudūd liability. In this version by contrast, the exponent—said 
to be the Prophet through ʿAlī—warns against completely neglecting ḥudūd laws. e 
subtext is that ḥudūd laws are necessary to give eﬀect to God’s prerogative and His will in 
legislating them in the ﬁrst place, as Ibn Ḥazm reasons above.
147) Qāḍī Nuʿmān, Daʿāʾim, 2:463 (variation in Arabic text: adds ḥadd min before ḥudūd 
Allāh) (cited in Ṭabarsī, Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, 18:26, no. 21,911 (in bāb annahu lā yamīn 
fī ʾ l-ḥudūd wa-anna ʾ l-ḥudūd tudraʾ biʾl-shubahāt)). Qāḍī Nuʿmān lists another version with 
wording echoing the ḥudūd maxim in his chapter on ḥudūd: “avoid [punishing] the believer 
as much as you can … (dāriʾ ʿan al-muʾmin mā ʾstaṭaʿt …).” Ibid., 2:442-3. Interestingly, 
he also mentions a saying something like this elsewhere, also without explicit reference to 
ḥudūd. See ibid., 1:417 (uniquely mentioning wa-lā tarkabanna ’l-shubha in the letter from 
ʿAlī to Mālik al-Ashtar, in place of a section including the ḥudūd maxim in the version of 
the letter recorded in Ibn Shuʿba al-Ḥarrānī in Tuḥaf al-ʿuqūl, 126-49) (quoted in Muḥam-
mad Bāqir al-Majlisī, Biḥār al-anwār (Tehran: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya, n.d.), 27:240-66). 
Neither quote appears in the standard version of the letter in al-Sharīf al-Rāḍī’s Nahj 
al-balāgha, 426-45, or any other. For a comparison of the letters, see Muḥammad Bāqir 
Maḥmūdī, Nahj al-saʿāda, ed. ʿAziz Āl Ṭālib (Tehran: Muʾassasat al-Ṭibāʿa waʾl-Nashr, 
Wizārat al-aqāfa waʾl-Irshād al-Islāmī, 1418-1422/[1997-8 to 2001-2]), 5:57-109; 
Muḥammad al-Rayshahrī, Mawsūʿat al-Imām ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib, ed. Maḥmūd al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī 
and Muḥammad Kāẓim al-Ṭabāṭabāʾī (Lebanon: Dār al-Ḥadīth, n.d.), 7:54-76. 
148) See Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, ʿUmdat al-qārī, 20:259; see also Suyūṭī, Jāmiʿ, 1:135, no. 
793. For notes on the diﬃculties involved in tracing this version to Ibn ʿAdī, see above, 
note 55 and accompanying text. In addition to that explanation, another issue worth 
mentioning is that this version appears only in the 4th century AH. It may be tempting to 
think that Ibn ʿ Adī or whoever formulated the compound maxim did this through copying 
it and its attribution to Ibn ʿAbbās from Abū Ḥanīfa’s Musnad by Ḥārithī (same formula). 
Indeed, Albānī suggests that such a borrowing is possible, asserting that Ibn ʿAdī’s record 
of the ḥadīth matches Ḥārithī’s records from Abū Ḥanīfa in both form and isnād. See 
Albānī, Irwāʾ al-ghalīl, 7:345. But this is not what occurred. e two are in fact diﬀerent: 
Ḥārithī never mentions the aqīlū saying; if anything the copyist would have appended that 
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 (3) Ibn ʿAbbās [no isnād]
Version 12
“Avoid ḥudūd [punishments] in cases of doubt or ambiguity, but there is to be no 
intercession, nor bail, nor oaths in ḥadd [proceedings].” (Idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd biʾl-
shubahāt wa-lā shafāʿa wa-lā kafāla wa-lā yamīn fī ḥadd.)
Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991-2)149 (1) Prophet Muḥammad [no isnād] 
Al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī (d. 1104/
 1693)150 (2) Muḥammad b. ʿ Alī b. al-Ḥusayn—...—Muḥam-
 mad 
Standard Version
“Avoid ḥudūd punishments in cases of doubt or ambiguity.” (Idraʾū ʾl-ḥudūd 
biʾl-shubahāt.)
Ḥārithī (d. 340/951-2)151 (1) Abū Saʿīd—Yaḥyā b. Farrūkh—Muḥammad b. 
Bishr—Abū Ḥanīfa—Miqsam—Ibn ʿAbbās
Ibn Bābawayh (d. 381/991-2)152 (2) Amīr al-Muʾminīn [= ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib] [no 
isnād ]
saying from elsewhere. Albānī may have conﬂated Abū Ḥanīfa’s version with this one, based 
on attributions of this version to Ibn ʿAbbās (by Ḥārithī in Abū Ḥanīfa’s Musnad and by 
Suyūṭī and later scholars) without having compared the isnād or the content. Finally, one 
might also suppose that Ibn ʿ Adī and Qāḍī Nuʿmān, who were contemporaries, copied the 
ḥadīth from a source common to both Sunnī and Shīʿī (Ismāʿīlī) traditionists. ere were 
no known interactions between them, and Qāḍī Nuʿmān copied from a limited amount 
of books available to him—so far as we know from Madelung’s list, from no work that 
would have included Ibn ʿ Adī’s sources. Instead, we know that Qāḍī Nuʿmān most probably 
copied his version of the maxim from a late 2nd/8th century source used also by Zaydīs. See 
above, notes 64-71, and accompanying text.
149) Ibn Bābawayh, Faqīh, 4:53.
150) According to al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, Wasāʾil al-Shīʿa, 28:48, no. 34,179. e source of this 
attribution is unclear, as Ibn Bābawayh attributes the saying directly to the Prophet in his 
Faqīh.
151) ʿAbd Allāh b. Muḥammad al-Ḥārith, Musnad Abī Ḥanīfa, ed. Abū Muḥammad 
al-Asyūṭī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1971), 39, no. 70.
152) Ibn Bābawayh, Muqniʿ (Qum: Muʾassasat al-Imām al-Hādī, 1994), 437 (cited in 
Ṭabarsī, Mustadrak al-Wasāʾil, 18:26, no. 21,912 [as p. 147]).
*Note on translations: I have translated shubha (pl. shubahāt) as “doubt” or “ambiguity” 
to cover two senses in which jurists use the term: uncertainties concerning questions of 
fact (“doubt”) as well as law (“ambiguity”). I have rendered the ḥudūd maxim as “avoid 
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Key
The following map includes the chains of transmission of the ḥadīth versions of the 
ḥudūd maxim from collections circulating in the first three centuries (as listed above). 
Fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh century chains are included only if discussed in the 
text and otherwise not represented in the previous collections directly.
Published collection
Problematic transmitter (see notes in main body)
Unbroken chain/direct attribution
Broken chain/indirect attribution
Bold Name Significant figure (discussed in the text and notes)
ḥudūd punishments in cases of doubt or ambiguity” to reﬂect this dual usage and the fact 
that jurists are the ones who typically determine whether shubha exists in making decisions 
about ḥadd liability. Darʾ is given alternately as “aversion” or “avoidance.” Aversion is the 
more literal translation (making shubha/shubahāt the active agent), but it obscures the fact 
that the judge or jurist typically acts as agent and addressee of the maxim; he or she is to 
recognize the legally cognizable types of shubha outlined in the legal texts and avoid 
imposing ḥudūd punish ments where they are present; in addition, “avoidance” better 
captures the similar sense of a usage in the familiar corpus of American legal maxims, such 
as “constitutional avoidance,” whereby judges are to avoid the serious consequences of 
deciding cases on the basis of constitutional doctrines where they can decide them on other 
grounds. Where relevant legal texts clearly intend to focus on shubha as the operative term, 
I have retained some form of the word “aversion” (e.g., ḥadd-averting ambiguity). 
(Alternative translations that are more literal, but more awkward and less communicative 
of the sense of the maxim, would be, “avert ḥudūd punishments with doubts and 
ambiguities,” or even “use doubts and ambiguities to avert ḥudūd punishments.”)
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